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INTRODUCTION
As international criminal trials continue to attract the world's atten-
tion, a fundamental question persists about their purposes. Are the goals
of international criminal trials primarily legal, similar to the objectives
of domestic criminal trials, or are they primarily political, designed for
purposes such as helping communities heal and compiling an accurate
record of the past? Court opinions and scholarly commentaries ac-
knowledge both the legal and political purposes of international crimi-
nal trials, but do not typically prioritize between them. These fundamen-
tal questions arise in each successive international criminal trial.
This Article examines the purpose of international criminal trials
through the perspective of an often overlooked, but important, partici-
pant: the defense attorney. Through personal interviews and question-
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naires, press reports, scholarly articles, and case law, I examine defense
attorneys' motivations, concerns, and strategies in representing those
accused of war crimes. I focus on what the attorneys perceive to be the
primary purposes of the trials. Do defense attorneys believe that these
trials serve primarily adjudicative purposes, such as determining guilt
and apportioning blame, or do they think that international trials are
primarily political proceedings-largely staged events designed to ac-
complish a political purpose? The perceptions and actions of defense
counsel are important not only because they may offer additional insight
into the purposes of international criminal trials, but also because, as
major participants, defense counsel themselves influence the nature of
the proceedings.
A perception exists, perhaps fueled by the politicized nature of the
recent high-profile trials of Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milo~evi6,
that international criminal trials are essentially political events cloaked
as judicial proceedings.' Yet these two trials do not appear to represent
accurately the majority of international criminal trials today, as per-
ceived by defense attorneys. The survey conducted here finds that, in
the great majority of recent or ongoing trials at international criminal
tribunals, defense attorneys believe that the trials serve primarily adju-
dicative purposes-separating the innocent from the guilty, following
fair procedures, and apportioning just punishment to those who are con-
victed.2 In other words, international trials today serve purposes very
similar to those that exist in ordinary domestic proceedings. The attor-
neys generally believe that a good number of their clients are factually
or legally innocent, that trial outcomes are not predetermined, and that
acquittals are possible. The survey did reveal a minority of defense at-
torneys who expressed a view that international criminal trials are heav-
ily political. The percentage of attorneys that held such views was
higher among ICTR than ICTY attorneys. But among practitioners at
both tribunals, this was a minority view.
1. Although Saddam Hussein's trial occurred in a domestic court, its international visibility
and its reliance on international law may have influenced public perceptions of international
criminal trials.
2. As discussed further in Part II, my definition of political trials draws on Judith Shklar's
discussion of the differences between "legalist" and political trials. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 149-151, 168-70 (1964). For related discus-
sion on the difference between legal and political trials, see, for example, OTTO KIRCHHEIMER,
POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS 46, 49 (1961); Jeremy
Peterson, Note, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein, 48 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 257, 260-79 (2007); Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55
DUKE L.J. 75, 76, 82 (2005).
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The survey further revealed that the attorneys themselves are not in-
clined to seek to politicize the proceedings. They generally respect the
legal authority of the court and do not tend to treat the trial as a political
event, even if that is what their client wishes. Contrary to some public
perceptions, most international criminal defense attorneys are not likely
to levy political arguments against the court. The tactics used by several
defendants in the media spotlight-Milogevi6 and Hussein and their de-
fense teams, for example-are the exception, rather than the rule, in in-
ternational criminal trials.
Several reasons help explain why defense attorneys may see interna-
tional trials today as genuinely contested on the facts and the law and
not as show trials. The first is the expanding and at times uncertain
scope of international criminal law itself. The second is the persistent
difficulty that the prosecution has in gathering and interpreting evidence
for international trials. The third is the adversarial nature of the proceed-
ings and the broad respect for defense rights at the existing international
tribunals. Defense lawyers respond to these realities and conduct them-
selves accordingly. These factors may also help explain why acquittal
rates at international criminal trials so far tend to be somewhat higher
than acquittal rates in domestic proceedings. 3
International criminal trials today are adjudicative and nonpolitical in
another sense as well. At least at the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), ongoing
trials are not particularly devoted to goals of reconciliation, healing, or
providing a historical record. Instead, the interviews show that these tri-
als are devoted to the narrower, more ordinary goals of punishing the
guilty, acquitting the innocent, and doing so efficiently. As the Article
will suggest, the recent drive of the ICTY and ICTR toward completion
of their proceedings has pushed the proceedings further away from
some of their original political purposes and toward the adjudicative
model.
This Article examines the purposes of trial proceedings. It does not
dwell on the politics surrounding the establishment of the tribunals, the
definition of the tribunals' jurisdiction, and prosecutorial charging deci-
sions. The UN Security Council, a fundamentally political body, created
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals for purposes that most would de-
scribe as political in nature: to reestablish peace and reconciliation in
these regions, and, some have argued, to atone for the international
3. For a discussion of acquittal rates, see infra notes 259-265 and accompanying text.
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community's failure to intervene in the conflicts. 4 The jurisdiction of
these tribunals was also much contested and was ultimately the result of
a political compromise. 5 Similarly, some commentators have observed
that prosecutorial charging decisions were to some degree influenced by
the political reality of the tribunals' dependence on states for enforce-
ment.6 But while politics may have dominated some of these prelimi-
nary decisions, according to most defense attorneys, its influence was
not lasting, and it plays a subsidiary role at trials today.
Finally, the Article focuses on the purposes of the international
criminal trial and not directly on the purposes of international criminal
law more generally. There is a distinction. One can believe that war
crimes and other crimes against humanity must be punished-for rea-
sons of deterrence and retribution, among others-without taking a po-
sition as to precisely how this is to be accomplished in every situation.
The debate about how to handle the Nazi leadership after World War II
is a good example. Many believed that cursory, non-public court-martial
proceedings, followed by execution of those judged responsible, was the
proper course. Others argued for more comprehensive trials. The latter
view ultimately prevailed and resulted in the Nuremberg trials. This de-
cision had many consequences, including acquittal of three of the de-
fendants. But the question remains to what degree trials were conducted
primarily with the aim of determining the possible innocence of some
defendants, as opposed to being conducted for larger political purposes,
such as providing a historical record of the horrors of the Nazi regime,
bringing a sense of closure to the era, and establishing a precedent for
the future rule of law in Germany. International criminal trials today
confront the same questions.
I. PURPOSES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
One of the fundamental questions about international criminal trials
is whether they serve primarily legal or political purposes. To under-
stand the distinction, it is useful to imagine that there were such things
4. E.g., PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 40-42 (James Thomas
Snyder, trans., Texas A&M Univ. Press 2004) (2000); RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
DIPLOMACY 1-2 (2004); GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 283 (2000).
5. KERR, supra note 4, at 90-91.
6. Id. at 179; KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIALS 61 (2006).
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as purely "legal" trials and purely "political" trials, and to examine the
characteristics of each. The purposes of the purely legal trial would be
limited to the determination of guilt and the assessment of blame
through fair procedures. In the purely legal trial, the political conse-
quences of that determination are irrelevant. The purely political trial,
on the other hand, is concerned above all with consequences. A political
trial may be a show trial, which simply provides the appearance of a le-
gal proceeding before inevitable conviction, and which typically serves
the purpose of silencing political enemies.7 Or it may serve more liberal
purposes, such as showing a society's break with a totalitarian past,
compiling an accurate historical record of atrocities and victims' suffer-
ing, or providing a form of catharsis for victimized individuals and
communities.8 Most international criminal trials serve both political and
legal purposes, but the real question is which purpose takes priority
when a tension between the two emerges. Before turning to that ques-
tion, it is helpful to examine the two types of purposes in greater detail.
A. The Legal Model of International Criminal Trials
Those who emphasize the legal aspect of trials argue that the main
function of trials is to determine individual culpability and to assess ap-
propriate punishment through a fair process. 9 In this view, justice de-
mands that the trial focus on the evidence bearing on the accused's guilt
or innocence of the crime charged. Questions not directly relevant to
these issues, such as the establishment of a thorough historical record,
or full public reckoning with the actions of a previous regime, are to be
left in the background.10
7. In a recent article, Jeremy Peterson defines "show trials" (which he views as a subset of po-
litical trials) in the following way:
[A] show trial can be defined by the presence of two elements. The first element is
increased probability of the defendant's conviction resulting from the planning and con-
trol of the trial. The second element is a focus on the audience outside of the courtroom
rather than on the accused-the extent to which the trial is designed or managed for the
benefit of external observers rather than for securing justice for the defendant.
Peterson, supra note 2, at 260.
8. Cf MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 65-72 (1997)
(discussing the use of show trials to break with the legacy of an abusive government and to allow
victims to mourn); SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 158, 168-70 (discussing the importance of using
international criminal trials to compile an accurate historical record).
9. See, e.g., Steven Kay & Bert Swart, The Role of the Defence, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1421, 1421-22 (Cassese et al. eds.,
2002).
10. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 5 (Penguin Books 1994) (1963).
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Determining individual guilt and apportioning due punishment are
the typical functions that trials serve in a domestic system of criminal
procedure. Modem understandings demand fair procedures to ensure
that retribution remains separate from private vengeance and that pun-
ishment is determined by law, not by private passions.' The person ac-
cused of crimes is tried and punished not simply on behalf of victims,
but on behalf of the community whose laws he is alleged to have
breached: "[I]t is the general public order that has been thrown out of
gear and must be restored, as it were."' 2 Criminal punishment as a
whole serves additional goals-including deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. But these other purposes of criminal justice are not,
strictly speaking, the focus of the criminal trial. They are only inciden-
tally served by trials focused on individual culpability and fair proce-
dures. For example, deterrence might be greater if we followed princi-
ples of mass culpability and punished a whole community for the crimes
of one of its members. But such actions would be contrary to the adjudi-
cative principles embodied in the criminal trial: protection of the inno-
cent and conviction and just punishment of the guilty.' 3
Some believe that the adjudicative model is as applicable to interna-
tional criminal trials as it is to domestic proceedings. Even the Nurem-
berg proceedings were expected to comply with notions of fairness and
individual criminal responsibility. President Truman, for instance, "was
very anxious that the four powers should co-operate in this new and
complex undertaking, and that the world should be impressed by the
fairness of the trial. These German murderers must be punished, but
only upon proof of individual guilt at a trial."'
14
Yet to others, a focus on individual culpability and fair procedures
may seem too narrow, especially in the context of international criminal
law.' 5 The legalist conception of trials emphasizes the importance of
applying rules equally to all and of treating every defendant in propor-
tion to his blameworthiness. But it does not address the larger goals that
11. See ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND
PAINFUL QUESTION 10-11 (1975); Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Jus-
tice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 801,830-31 (2006).
12. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 261.
13. Of course, a large body of legal thought addresses the balance to be struck between ensur-
ing conviction of the guilty and acquittal of the innocent. An example is the familiar maxim,
"Better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *353.
14. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 372 (1962).
15. See SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 112.
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many see in the international criminal trials. For that reason, many find
that a narrow focus on the legal purposes of trials is inappropriate in in-
ternational criminal law.
B. The Political Model of International Criminal Trials
Under the political view of international criminal trials, the process of
a trial would be important even if it could be known with certainty, in
advance, that the defendant is guilty. In cases where public information
overwhelmingly establishes guilt, some have doubted the need for trials
at all. After World War II, for example, Winston Churchill thought that
Nazi top commanders should be given a brief court-martial proceeding
and then should be executed.' 6 Still, as the designers of the Nuremberg
trial understood, trials may be important for political reasons even
where guilt is not at issue. Three key political reasons to have interna-
tional criminal trials include: 1) replacing private vengeance with the
rule of law and thereby promoting long-term peace and stability; 2) cre-
ating a historical record as a means to educate future generations; and 3)
providing a sense of closure for the injured individuals and communi-
ties.
Domestic trials also serve some of these "political" purposes, but the
emphasis on them in international trials is more pronounced. These pur-
poses have long been considered to provide a central justification for in-
ternational criminal trials. International trials are, to a much greater de-
gree, addressed to audiences outside the courtroom.17
This difference in emphasis may have consequences for procedures
applied within the courtroom. Whereas a pure legalist may insist on ac-
quittal on technical or procedural grounds, someone concerned with the
political effect of trials may favor overlooking some technical issues if
the trials ultimately serve the goals of peace and reconciliation or of
compiling a fuller historical record.' 8 At the extreme end of this spec-
16. See ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 64-65 (1983).
17. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 263.
18. Eric Stover describes a similar tension between what he calls the "legal purists" and "le-
gal moralists":
On one side are those who argue that law, in its most general sense, is a "system of
rules and procedures" that should never be bent or altered to satisfy wider social or po-
litical goals. On the other side are those who believe criminal trials "must be seen not
simply as a procedural device whose legitimacy is governed by rules generated within
the system of legality itself, but as complex ritual which produces and suppresses narra-
tive and clarifies and obscures history." A pedagogic trial, [they] argue, can help people
who have survived a period of traumatic history "reassess their foundational beliefs and
constitutive commitments," as well as create "transformative opportunities" for both in-
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trum, however, is the show trial, in which the proceeding is a staged
event, and the outcome is predetermined.
Although many political trials are not show trials, and they arguably
serve commendable liberal purposes, political aims do at times clash
with the goal of adjudicating individual culpability. The further a trial
strays from its focus on the adjudicative function, the more likely it is to
disregard the defendant's rights in pursuit of non-legal purposes. 19 It is
therefore worth examining in greater detail what non-legal purposes an
international criminal trial might pursue and what tensions between
these purposes and the classic goals of adjudication might arise.
1. Promoting Peace and Reconciliation
A long-standing political theory of international criminal trials sug-
gests they can help put an end to violence by providing a regularized,
peaceful way of settling accounts.20 Writing about the Nuremberg trial,
Judith Shklar observed that the trial's immediate function, and one of its
greatest social contributions, was that it "replaced private, uncontrolled
vengeance with a measured process of fixing guilt in each case, and tak-
ing the power to punish out of the hands of those directly injured., 21 In
its first annual report to the General Assembly and the Security Council,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
also embraced this rationale. The ICTY stated that its work will contrib-
ute to peace and reconciliation because "[t]he only civilised alternative
to this desire for revenge is to render justice";2 2 by contrast, "impunity
dividuals and societies.
ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE 23
(2005) (quoting LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT 112-13 (2001) and OSIEL,
supra note 8, at 2).
19. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 266.
20. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Objection of the Republic
of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 154 (July 18, 1997) ("The International
Tribunal was established to aid in the restoration and maintenance of peace in the former Yugo-
slavia. As a criminal court, its primary obligation is to provide a fair and expeditious trial and to
guarantee the rights of the accused. This adjudicatory process strengthens the rule of law, a fun-
damental principle shared by all members of the international community. If effective, this may
contribute to reconciliation, which is a precondition for lasting peace."); see also Ruti Teitel,
Bringing the Messiah Through the Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS:
GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 177, 177 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999) (noting that the "es-
sential mission of the ICTY is to transform the conflict in the Balkans to one of individual crimes
answerable to the rule of law, and so to achieve peace and reconciliation").
21. SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 158.
22. The President of the International Tribunal, First Annual Report of the International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 11-15, U.N.
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of the guilty only would fuel the desire for vengeance in the former
Yugoslavia, jeopardising the return to the 'rule of law', 'reconciliation'
and the restoration of 'true peace.,,'
23
In another version of this argument, scholars have argued that trials
advance peace and reconciliation by laying the blame on a few specific
individuals and deflecting it from the larger community that might also
have been complicit in some of the crimes.24 As Antonio Cassese, a
former judge and President of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, explains, international criminal trials "establish
individual responsibility over collective assignation of guilt" and in this
way counteract calls for vengeance against a whole community. The
trials show victims that the perpetrators of international crimes will be
made to pay for their crimes in a court of law, and this assurance of pun-
ishment opens up the possibility for reconciliation among the remaining
members of the community. Reconciliation can advance as trials estab-
lish an authoritative record of the conflict. 6
The ICTY's judgment in Prosecutor v. NikoliU summarizes the ar-
gument that trials contribute to peace and reconciliation:
The tribunal was further to contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace through criminal proceedings. The imme-
diate consequence of such proceedings was the removal of those
persons most responsible for the commission of crimes in the
course of-and even in furtherance of-the armed conflict. Ad-
ditionally, by holding individuals responsible for the crimes
committed, it was hoped that a particular ethnic or religious
group (or even political organisation) would not be held respon-
sible for such crimes by members of other ethnic or religious
groups, and that the guilt of the few would not be shifted to the
innocent.27
Doc. S/1994/1007, A/49/342 (Aug. 29, 1994) [hereinafter First Annual Report].
23. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22, Judgment, 58 & n.17 (Nov. 29, 1996); see
also First Annual Report, supra note 22, 11-16.
24. Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1998); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1996) (as-
serting that "if you want peace, you must work for justice").
25. Cassese, supra note 24, at 6.
26. For a more skeptical view, see Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Prin-
ciple and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 2003/04, at
5.
27. Prosecutor v. Nikoli6, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Judgment, 60 (Dec. 2, 2003).
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A trial may therefore be fully consistent with both the legal purpose
of apportioning individual guilt and the political purpose of promoting
peace and reconciliation. But if peace and reconciliation become the
primary purposes of trials, rather than incidental consequences, this
could give rise to tensions with the legal model. Such tensions could oc-
cur, for example, where the court makes sentencing decisions based on
the effect such decisions would have on peace and reconciliation and
not based on the charged individuals' relative blameworthiness for in-
ternational crimes. 28 It is at such points of tension that we can see
whether trials serve primarily political or legal aims.
2. Compiling an Accurate Historical Record
Another goal of international criminal trials is to help create an accu-
rate historical record. Justice Robert Jackson, who served as the chief
prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Tribunal, thought that
one of the most important contributions of the trial was to establish "un-
deniable proofs of incredible events." 29 Similarly, Judith Shklar argued
that the Nuremberg trial was an effective medium for educating German
elites about the crimes committed by their predecessors and for prevent-
ing revisionist accounts of the past.
30
The international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda have also been viewed as means to establishing accurate his-
torical records of the atrocities committed during the conflicts in these
countries. 31 The establishment of an authoritative record is seen as a
28. An example of this tension is the plea agreement between ICTY prosecutors and Biljana
Plavgi, the former co-President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who helped
implement the Bosnian Serbs' ethnic-cleansing campaign against Bosnian Muslims and Croats.
As part of the plea agreement, the prosecution withdrew genocide charges against Plavgid and
argued that Plavgi's guilty plea was "an unprecedented contribution to the establishment of truth
and a significant effort toward the advancement of reconciliation." On the basis of this recom-
mendation and related evidence, the court sentenced Plavgi6 to only eleven years in prison. Bos-
nian victims of ethnic cleansing were outraged by the low sentence. Nancy Amoury Combs, Pro-
curing Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of Sentence Discounts, 59
VAND. L. REv. 92-93 (2006).
29. International Military Tribunal, Nov. 21, 1945, Morning Session, in 2 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG, 14
November 1945-1 October 1946, at 95, 99 (1947).
30. SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 155-56 ("[The trial was] a legalistic means of eliminating the
Nazi leaders in such a way that their contemporaries, on whom the immediate future of Germany
depended, might learn exactly what had occurred in recent history.").
31. Nikoli6, Case No. IT-02-60/1 -S, Judgment, 60 (noting that one of the founding goals of
the ICTY was that "through public proceedings, the truth about the possible commission of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide was to be determined, thereby establishing an ac-
curate, accessible historical record"); U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4161st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
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valuable goal in its own right, but also as a means to discouraging his-
torical revisionism, 32 restoring peace in the region,33 and preventing fu-
ture acts of aggression. 34 Because of the value of presenting and pre-
serving important testimonial and documentary evidence at trial, some
judges at the tribunals have been somewhat reluctant to accept guilty
pleas, "which may only establish the bare factual allegations in an in-
dictment or may be supplemented by a statement of facts and accep-
tance of responsibility by the accused. 35
At the same time, some ICTY officials and judges have noted the
limitations of trials in establishing historical truth.36 Scholars have also
expressed doubts about the notion of using trials to produce historical
narrative. 37 In particular, there is a concern that the focus on producing a
complete historical record may be in tension with the principle of indi-
vidual culpability.38 Under traditional notions of criminal law, the trial
must focus on the specific charges against the defendant. Evidence of
mass complicity, foreign involvement, or even the true origins of the
conflict may not be relevant to these charges and may even be prejudi-
cial.39
S/PV.4161 (June 20, 2000) (statement of Judge Claude Jorda); Interview with Judge Richard
Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and the ICTR (Dec. 13, 1995), in 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 373, 377-78 (1995).
32. U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4161st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4161 (June 20, 2000) (state-
ment of Judge Claude Jorda).
33. Nikoli6, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Judgment, 60.
34. Id.
35. Id. 61.
36. Id. 60; U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4063d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4063 (Nov. 10, 1999)
(statement of ICTY and ICTR Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte) ("[O]ur task is not to prepare a com-
plete list of war casualties. Our primary task is to gather evidence relevant to criminal charges.");
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture: The Changing Nature
of the Laws of War, 156 MIL. L. REv. 30, 44 (1998) (observing that trial records may not reflect
the role of foreign actors), cited in Developments in the Law - The Promises of International
Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1957, 1973 n.101 (2001) [hereinafter The Promises ofInterna-
tional Prosecution].
37. Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 463, 524 (1995) ("[J]udges-when faithful to liberal law and professional ethics-may
make poor historians...."); see also Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Col-
laborator Paul Touvier for Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 191, 215-
18 (1995) (discussing the difficulty of using the Touvier trial as a means of establishing a histori-
cal record of Nazi crimes in France).
38. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enter-
prise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L.
REv. 75, 95 (2005).
39. The Promises ofInternational Prosecution, supra note 36, at 1973 (noting this tension
and citing a number of sources who have acknowledged it); Osiel, supra note 37, at 560-63
(pointing out the constraining effects of temporal jurisdiction); McDonald, supra note 36, at 44
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When the prosecution introduces evidence to establish other histori-
cal facts, beyond those that prove the charges against the defendant,
"the temptation is great to hold any given defendant responsible for as
wide a swath of destruction as possible. 40 The prosecution's attempt to
build a historical record may also delay trials and present the defense
with an overwhelming amount of documents to review.41
This tension between broad contextual evidence and a focus on the
defendant has marked war crimes proceedings since Nuremberg. At
Nuremberg, prosecutors introduced into evidence a documentary film
called Nazi Concentration Camps, which graphically illustrated the re-
sults of the horrifying crimes with which the defendants were charged.42
The film stirred the judges and the audience in the courtroom and hard-
ened feelings against the defendants.43 Telford Taylor, a member of the
prosecution team, noted that "it contributed little to the determination of
the individual guilt. '44 Yet it undoubtedly helped create a fuller record
of the unspeakable atrocities committed by the Nazis.
Similarly, at the trial of Adolf Eichmann for crimes against humanity,
the prosecutor introduced a great deal of testimony that was not ad-
dressed to Eichmann's individual culpability. The reason for this was
that the Israeli government and the prosecutor himself aimed to use the
legal proceedings to establish a record of the Nazi atrocities for the
world to see and to provide a public venue for survivors to tell their sto-
ries. Hannah Arendt was one of the outspoken critics of this strategy.
She commented that the prosecutor "went as far as to put witness after
witness on the stand who testified to things that, while gruesome and
true enough, had no or only the slightest connection with the deeds of
the accused.'45 Tensions of this kind continue to arise in today's inter-
national criminal trials.46
(observing that trial records may not reflect the role of foreign actors).
40. Danner & Martinez, supra note 38, at 95.
41. See, e.g., Telephone Interview # 4, Defense Attorney, ICTY and ICTR (Aug. 8, 2006).
42. STOVER, supra note 18, at 20 (citing LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT
23-64(2001)).
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 187 (1992)).
45. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 18. Arendt added that, by doing so, the prosecutor turned the
proceedings into a show trial. Id. at 6, 9.
46. For a debate on this question among commentators, see, for example, OSIEL, supra note
8, at 59-78; STOVER, supra note 18, at 10, 127; Marie-Bdnddicte Dembour & Emily Haslam, Si-
lencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151, 151-52
(2004).
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3. Providing Closure for Victims
International criminal trials are also said to serve survivors of the
crimes by helping them and their communities achieve a sense of clo-
sure. One author has called these trials "an enormous national psycho-
drama, psychotherapy on a nationwide scale."' 7 Trials serve this func-
tion by providing a forum for victims to tell their stories and to have the
wrongs done to them formally acknowledged. 48 Although some com-
mentators doubt the cathartic effects of trials and suggest that some vic-
tims may be re-traumatized as a result of their testimony,49 international
tribunals accept the notion that trials can serve victims' need for healing
and closure. As the ICTY reported in 1997, "[W]itnesses who have
come to The Hague have commented afterwards that the opportunity to
testify before a duly constituted court has brought them great relief. Jus-
tice's cathartic effects may therefore promise hope for recovery and
reconciliation...., 50 Both international courts and commentators have
also stated that trials may serve as a "ritualized event to channel the
grieving process" of the larger community, not just of individual vic-
tims. 51 In Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, ICTY judges opined that interna-
tional trials are valuable for allowing the "sorely afflicted to mourn
those among them who had been unjustly killed., 52
Yet these functions of trials may also be in tension with the legal
model. For example, protective measures for witnesses may interfere to
some degree with the defendant's right to confront and examine his ac-
cusers. 53 Similarly, allowing hundreds of witnesses to tell their full story
47. Osiel, supra note 37, at 471 (quoting French historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie).
48. The Promises of International Prosecution, supra note 36, at 1970-71; Minna Schrag,
The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15, 19 (1997).
49. E.g., Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Inter-
vention, Paper for a Symposium on the Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims, Office for Vic-
tims of Crime and National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, June 2000, at 1-2, cited in
STOVER, supra note 18, at 81-82; cf Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prose-
cuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 295 (2005) (identi-
fying different trial dynamics, some of which help, while others injure, victims who testify).
50. The Secretary-General, Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prose-
cution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Commit-
ted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 192, delivered to the General Assem-
bly, U.N. Doc. A/52/375, S/1997/729 (Sept. 18, 1997).
51. The Promises of International Prosecution, supra note 36, at 1971; see also Prosecutor v.
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 65 (Nov. 29, 1996); Osiel, supra note
37, at 471.
52. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 65.
53. See Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235 (1996).
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may interfere with the defendant's right to a speedy trial and potentially
overwhelm the defense with extraneous information.54
C. Relevance of the Distinction Between Politics and Law
The "legal" and "political" conceptions of international criminal tri-
als are ideal types. To some degree, all law is political. What I describe
here as the legal or adjudicative model reflects a liberal ideology of a
fair trial. Yet even if the adjudicative model itself is bound up with a
particular ideological conception of criminal trials, this does not mean
that the distinction between the political and the legal is irrelevant. As
mentioned earlier, when trials move further along the political spectrum,
defendants' rights often suffer. To the extent that we are concerned
about preserving space for individual rights in the face of larger political
social goals, we should be careful to distinguish between political and
legal elements in criminal trials. The frequent use of show trials by op-
pressive regimes reminds us of this very real and relevant distinction.
Even at trials which are not exclusively political, there are instances
in which political and adjudicative purposes clash, and one must be pri-
oritized above the other. Before one can make this choice, it is impor-
tant to understand first which element-the political or the legal-in
fact predominates at international criminal trials today. Are we moving
toward a more legalistic conception of international criminal trials, such
that these trials increasingly resemble ordinary domestic proceedings?
Or are international criminal trials still idiosyncratic proceedings with a
disproportionately heavy political component?
II. DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES ON THE PURPOSES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIALS
One way to determine whether international criminal trials today are
primarily adjudicative or primarily political is to examine the views and
actions of defense attorneys. Although the academic literature has
largely overlooked the experiences of the defense in international crimi-
nal trials,55 defense attorneys can be an important source of information
54. More broadly, a focus on the victims at trial has been criticized by Hannah Arendt and
others as deflecting from the main purpose of the trial- judging the accused and his deeds.
ARENDT, supra note 10, at 5, 18; MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW 56 (1981),
cited in OSIEL, supra note 8, at 65.
55. The few works that address international criminal defense focus above all on the rules
governing the conduct of attorneys and not on the perspectives of attorneys themselves. See
MICHAEL BOHLANDER ET AL., DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2006);
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about the trials' purposes. For example, if these attorneys perceive their
own role as actively pursuing acquittals and believe they have a chance
of obtaining such acquittals, this could be evidence that trials are be-
coming increasingly adjudicative in nature, as opposed to being primar-
ily political events. If defense attorneys generally pursue their factual
and legal cases (as opposed to extra-legal political arguments) with
great zeal, this may also indicate a strong belief in the contested nature
of the proceedings.56 By contrast, if defense attorneys are resigned to
the conviction of their clients, and they use the trial primarily to ad-
vance an ideology or as a platform for political statements, then this
might suggest that trials are, at least in the minds of these attorneys,
staged above all for political purposes.
As mentioned earlier, the political and legal purposes are not always
in conflict. Without question, defense attorneys believe that trials serve
both purposes. But as described below, their litigation strategies as well
as their interview responses suggest that they believe that the primary
goal is to adjudicate guilt and innocence through fair procedures.
A. Methodology
To study the views of defense attorneys at international criminal tri-
bunals, I surveyed attorneys who are currently working or have worked
at the ICTY, ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The
number of active international criminal defense attorneys at these tribu-
nals is somewhere in the low 200s. 57 The study consists of responses
Mark S. Ellis, The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing Before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 949 (2003) [hereinafter Evolution of
Defense Counsel]; Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribu-
nal: Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519, 528 (1997); Kenneth
S. Gallant, The Role and Powers of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 34 INT'L LAW. 21 (2000); Judith A. McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney
Conduct in International Tribunals: A Case Study of the ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
139 (2007); David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 975 (2003); Developments in the Law, Fair Trials and the Role ofInternational
Criminal Defense, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1982 (2001) [hereinafter Fair Trials].
56. Cf David Luban, Twenty Theses on the Adversarial System, in BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 134, 139-40 (Helen Stacy & Michael Lavarch eds., 1999) (discussing the
link between zealous advocacy and adversarial proceedings). To some degree, as I discuss later,
this may also be a function of previous training and professional experience.
57. There are about 110 attorneys currently handling cases at the ICTY, and about a 100 be-
fore the ICTR, though a few of the attorneys practice at both. Hirondelle News, New Board for
the ICTR Defence Attorneys' Association, May 30, 2006, http://www.hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf
(noting that about 100 defense attorneys are currently working at the ICTR). The ICTY numbers
are based on an ICTY Chambers list of defense attorneys assigned to ongoing and closed cases,
which is on file with the author. There are at most fifteen lawyers on the roster of the Special
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from forty-four attorneys. Twenty-five interviews were conducted in
person or by phone, and nineteen questionnaires were completed in
writing.
To gather this data sample, I emailed or called attorneys practicing at
the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, describing the goals of the project in brief,
requesting the attorneys' participation in the project, and offering ano-
nymity for their responses.58 I first sent emails to all defense attorneys
listed as full-time members of the Association of Defence Counsel prac-
ticing before the ICTY (ADC-ICTY). The ADC-ICTY list is representa-
tive because an attorney has to be a member of the association in order
to be admitted to practice before the tribunal. At the ICTR, I contacted
attorneys based on a list provided to me by the ICTR Registry. 59 I also
used personal contacts to solicit interviews, and I relied on the inter-
viewees themselves to refer me to other attorneys in the field. Some of
these other attorneys were not listed as current members of the ADC-
ICTY or were not on the ICTR Registry list, but they were part of the
relevant sample because they had at some point practiced before the
ICTY or ICTR.
Twenty-six of my interviewees have represented defendants at the
ICTY, twenty-four have represented defendants at the ICTR, and five
have represented defendants at the SCSL. 60 Twenty-four of the respon-
dents are native English speakers with a common-law background
(though some are French Canadians who are at least bilingual and are
trained in the mixed legal system of French Canada). The remaining
twenty are from a civil-law background, and ten of them are from the
former Yugoslavia. Four of the ICTR respondents are from African
countries, but none are from Rwanda itself. This is because no Rwan-
dans practice as defense attorneys before the ICTR, and defendants
there have to rely on counsel from foreign countries. Finally, two of the
Court for Sierra Leone who are not also included in the ICTY or ICTR numbers. Special Court
for Sierra Leone, Defence, Roster of Assigned Counsel, http://www.sc-sl.org/defence-
assignedcounsel.html.
58. To preserve the anonymity of all those who requested it, I cite to interview or question-
naire responses by number, even for the seventeen attorneys who did not request anonymity. For
brevity, I sometimes use the masculine pronoun in referring to certain attorneys' responses, but
this does not necessarily mean that the respondent was male. Because of the low number of fe-
male defense attorneys at the tribunals, keeping secret the gender of the respondent is part of the
effort to preserve anonymity.
59. This was necessary because there is no publicly available list of the emails of ICTR coun-
sel, as there is of the members of the ADC-ICTY.
60. As the numbers suggest, some of the attorneys have represented defendants in more than
one court.
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ICTR interviewees served on the defense legal team as legal assistants,
even though they had been practicing lawyers in their home jurisdic-
tions; their responsibilities and contacts with the defendants at the tribu-
nals were therefore different from those of the main defense counsel.
While the personal interviews formed the basis for my conclusions
on defense views of international criminal trials, I also relied on inter-
views that the attorneys had given to other scholars and reporters and on
the attorneys' own speeches and writings. To obtain a broader view of
the defense role at the international tribunals, I also discussed these is-
sues with several ICTY and ICTR prosecutors, ICTY Registry officials,
and legal associates at the ICTY Chambers. 61 Finally, to examine
whether the defense attorneys' views corresponded to their actions in
court, I researched ICTY and ICTR rulings and transcripts, as well as
scholarly writings, for the motions, arguments, and tactics used by de-
fense attorneys at the international criminal tribunals.
B. Motivations of Defense Attorneys
Because professional and life experiences are likely to influence the
views of defense attorneys, it is important to review first how the attor-
neys made the choice to represent defendants charged with international
crimes. If the attorneys had taken on politically controversial cases at
home, for example, this may indicate that their interest in international
criminal law work has a political component to it.62 Similarly, the attor-
neys' explanation of why they took on international criminal cases can
provide additional clues as to whether they are pursuing primarily po-
litical or primarily legal goals in their representation.
The interview responses suggest that the typical international crimi-
nal defense attorney is not a lawyer with a political agenda, but rather an
experienced defense attorney interested in taking on a new professional
challenge. Despite concerns among some commentators that defense at-
tomeys lack adequate qualifications to perform the complex work re-
61. I conducted two interviews with ICTY prosecutors, two with ICTY Registry officials, and
had two informal conversations with ICTY Chambers legal associates. I also received one com-
pleted questionnaire from an ICTR prosecutor.
62. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1356, 1360-61 (1989) (describing how Jacques Verges, representing
Klaus Barbie at his trial for crimes against humanity in France, had developed a practice of taking
on politically charged cases); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Representing Saddan Hussein: The Impor-
tance of Being Ramsey Clark, 42 GA. L. REV. 47 (noting the same pattern with respect to Ramsey
Clark).
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quired by international criminal trials, 63 the interviews suggest that the
average defense attorney at the ICTY and ICTR is in fact very experi-
enced in criminal law. The majority of my respondents have practiced
for at least fifteen years in their home jurisdiction, and their practice
area has been predominantly criminal law.64 This is not surprising in
light of the qualification requirements for counsel at the tribunals. At the
ICTY, counsel assigned to indigent accused must have at least seven
years of relevant experience in criminal proceedings and must establish
competence in criminal law, international criminal law, humanitarian
law, or human rights law.65 The ICTR, in turn, requires that counsel as-
signed to an indigent suspect or accused have at least ten years of "rele-
vant experience. ' 66 Because over ninety percent of defendants at the
ICTY and ICTR are represented by assigned counsel, these require-
ments apply to the vast majority of defense attorneys practicing at the
international tribunals.
67
On the other hand, because of the length of trials at the tribunals,
stretching to several years from pretrial to appeal, defense attorneys
have relatively little experience in international criminal law. Very few
of the respondents have represented more than three defendants charged
with international crimes, which is typical of international criminal de-
fense attorneys generally. 68 The attorneys' ability to gather experience
at the international tribunals is hampered by the tribunals' policy against
representation of more than one defendant at a time. 69 These findings
suggest that the identity of lawyers at the ICTY and ICTR is likely to be
shaped a great deal more by their work as defense attorneys in their
home jurisdictions than by their experience in the international criminal
justice system.
63. Tolbert, supra note 55, at 977.
64. Of the total forty-four respondents, fifteen had more than twenty years of experience in
criminal law, and another twenty had at least sixteen years of experience practicing in a number
of areas, including criminal or international law.
65. Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 45, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-
e/index.htm.
66. Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 45, U.N.
Doc. ITR/3/REV. I (2005), available at http://www.ictr.org.
67. Ellis, Evolution of Defense Counsel, supra note 55, at 951 & n.14; Christian Rohde, Legal
Aid & Defence Counsel Matters, in ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: PRACTICE,
PROCEDURE AND EvIDENCE 543, 561 (Rodney Dixon & Karim A. A. Khan eds., 2003).
68. Rohde, supra note 67, at 564.
69. Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, ICT/73/REV. 1I, as amended July 11,
2006, art. 16(G), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index-t.html; see also Interview #
9, ICTY Registry Official, The Hague, Netherlands (July 20, 2006).
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The respondents' self-professed motivations for taking on interna-
tional criminal cases rarely have anything to do with the politics of the
attorney or the client. Most respondents described the primary reason
for taking up such cases as professional curiosity.7 0 They took the cases
because of the intellectual challenge of practicing in a new and rapidly
changing area of criminal and international law. Some added that what
attracted them to the field was the possibility of influencing the devel-
opment of international criminal law. 7' A few also saw an opportunity
for advancing their legal career at home as a result of representing high-
profile defendants at the international tribunals. 72 Finally, many were
motivated by an interest in the subject-matter-whether because they
had enjoyed international law classes in law school or because they had
become involved in transnational legal practice later and found the work
intellectually stimulating.73
None of the attorneys from Western countries saw financial remu-
neration as a sufficient incentive for them to take on international cases.
In fact, many pointed to low pay as a discouraging factor, particularly
because international work interfered with their ability to maintain an
established practice at home.74 By contrast, for some of the Yugoslav
attorneys, the expected compensation was an independent motivation to
accept cases.7 This is consistent with previous observations about the
incentives for lawyers from the former Yugoslavia or from Africa who
choose to practice before international criminal courts.76 These lawyers
perceive the compensation at the tribunals more favorably than their
Western colleagues because it is higher than what they can earn at
home.
If money is not a driving factor for many of the attorneys, it might
seem that there must be an ideological element to their decision to leave
70. Thirty-one of the respondents identified professional interest as their primary motivation
for taking on international criminal cases.
71. E.g., Telephone Interview # 10, Defense Attorney, ICTY and ICTR (Oct. 11, 2006).
72. At least five respondents noted this as their primary motivation. Telephone Interview #
12, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Sept. 24, 2006); Questionnaire # 1, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Aug.
2, 2006); Questionnaire # 2, Defense Attorney, ICTY (July 21, 2006); Questionnaire # 3, Defense
Attorney, ICTR (Aug. 4, 2006); Questionnaire # 10, Defense Attorney, ICTR (July 15, 2007).
73. E.g., Interview # 1, Defense Attorney, ICTY, The Hague, Netherlands (July 13, 2006);
Questionnaire # 1, supra note 72.
74. E.g., Interview # 1, supra note 73; Questionnaire # 7, Defense Attorney, ICTR (Oct. 27,
2007).
75. Questionnaire # 1, supra note 72; Questionnaire # 15, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Aug. 12,
2007); Telephone Interview # 18, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Oct. 5, 2006).
76. Ellis, Evolution of Defense Counsel, supra note 55, at 954; Fair Trials, supra note 55, at
1997.
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an established practice at home to represent defendants charged with in-
ternational crimes. But the attorneys' responses to interview questions
suggest that most lawyers are not driven by political or ideological mo-
tivations in their representation of international criminal defendants.
77
To the extent that attorneys admit that ideology shapes their decisions to
work on international criminal cases, it is usually the same broad ideol-
ogy that drives many domestic defense attorneys: a belief in the impor-
tance of fair trial78 and in the right to representation for even the most
unpopular defendants.79
As the next Section discusses in greater detail, another factor moti-
vating some attorneys may be the belief in the innocence of their clients.
A few attorneys pointed out that their motivation strengthened as they
learned more about their clients and their cases. One attorney cited as a
motive for pursuing the case that "it was nice to know that [his] client
was on the right side"; 80 another similarly suggested that "to [his] sur-
prise, [he] found someone who was not guilty of the crimes with which
he was charged.",
81
C. Belief in Acquittals and Clients' Innocence
To test whether defense attorneys believe that international criminal
trials are more political than adjudicative in nature, I inquired into the
attorneys' views on the possibility of acquittals and on the innocence of
their clients. If lawyers thought that these trials had a predetermined
outcome and were staged for political reasons, they would be less likely
to express a belief that acquittals were a realistic possibility. But in fact,
the survey of defense perceptions shows that most lawyers actively pur-
77. But see, e.g., Questionnaire # 11, Defense Attorney, ICTR (July 22, 2007) ("My primary
motivation was the fact that the conflicts that led to the war [in Rwanda] and crimes in the respec-
tive countries were a result of foreign interference, neocolonialism, lack of democracy, poverty
and economic exploitation. Also, some of the courts like ICTR were set up by foreign powers that
were complicit in the conflict and intended to be victor's courts. In that regard, I felt the need to
be by the side of persons standing trial in such circumstances because in a sense I perceived the
system as inherently unfair.").
78. E.g., Interview # 3, Defense Attorney, ICTY and ICTR, The Hague, Netherlands (July 18,
2006); Questionnaire # 2, supra note 72; Questionnaire # 4, Defense Attorney, ICTY and ICTR
(Aug. 12, 2006).
79. E.g., Interview # 4, supra note 41; Questionnaire # 6, Defense Attorney, ICTY and ICTR
(Aug. 22, 2006).
80. Interview # 2, Defense Attorney, SCSL (July 17, 2006).
81. Questionnaire # 3, supra note 72.
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sue acquittals in their cases, 82 and, more importantly, the majority per-
ceive that acquittals are possible in at least some of their cases.83
Only ten of my forty-four respondents believed that acquittals were
not a realistic possibility for the defendants they represented. Eight of
these ten attorneys further stated a belief that their clients were not
guilty84 and blamed the politics of the tribunals for the impossibility of
acquittal. For example, two ICTY lawyers stated that acquittals were
"practically impossible" 85 or "highly unlikely" 86 because of the politics
in their particular, high-profile cases. Another ICTY lawyer similarly
thought that acquittals are "quite tough, quite unrealistic" and added that
"[a]cquittals are done on political considerations. If [the defendants] are
Serbs, they might be acquitted if the tribunal decides-we've acquitted
some Muslims and some Croats, so maybe we should acquit a Serb." 87
Three attorneys who practice at the ICTR also believed that political
pressure on that tribunal effectively eliminated the possibility of acquit-
tals there. 88 One who practices at both the ICTY and ICTR stated that
both of his clients "would be found innocent in any other court in an or-
dinary jurisdiction, but both tribunals are political organizations and jus-
tice is not their goal. 89
Politicized views of this kind are commonly ascribed to international
criminal defense lawyers, perhaps because attorneys for high-profile de-
82. Thirty-two interviewees stated without qualification that they actively pursued acquittals.
Six stated that they pursued acquittals in only some of their cases or on only some counts. An-
other six stated that they did not actively pursue acquittals, and four of these elaborated that this
was because their clients pleaded guilty.
83. Thirteen respondents stated that they believed acquittals were possible in all of their
cases. Seventeen stated that they believed acquittals were possible in some of the cases or on
some of the counts.
84. Two of them stated that their clients were "presumed innocent" or "legally innocent."
Questionnaire # 17, Defense Attorney, ICTR (Aug. 21, 2007); Telephone Interview # 22, Defense
Attorney, ICTY (Oct. 11, 2006).
85. Interview # 12, supra note 72.
86. Telephone Interview # 15, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Oct. 2, 2006) (stating that acquittal
was "possible, but highly unlikely").
87. Telephone Interview # 21, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Oct. 9, 2006).
88. Interview # 10, supra note 71 (noting that because ICTR was heavily politicized, it was
very difficult to get an acquittal there even where an acquittal may be possible before a jury in the
United States); Telephone Interview # 26, Defense Attorney, ICTR (Oct. 30, 2006) ("These tribu-
nals are creatures of the UN, and there is political pressure from Rwanda and from all kinds of
levels. The government of Rwanda has a special representative to the court. When he sees things
that he does not like, they put pressure on the tribunal."); Telephone Interview # 28, Defense At-
torney, ICTY and ICTR (Nov. 7, 2006); see also Questionnaire # 7, supra note 74 (stating that,
because of politics, there are few chances of acquittal at the ICTR, but still expressing belief that
acquittal is possible in one of his two cases).
89. Interview # 28, supra note 88.
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fendants like Slobodan Milogevi6 and Saddam Hussein have taken a
more political stance towards war crimes trials.90 But the survey sug-
gests that such views are held by only a minority of defense attorneys.
Most lawyers appearing before the international criminal tribunals be-
lieve that the tribunals offer a possibility of acquittal and that trial out-
comes are not predetermined.
This offers an interesting point of comparison to attorneys practicing
in domestic systems. In studies of U.S. defense attorneys in federal
court, for example, respondents assert that they work to achieve the best
possible result for their clients, but they add that their odds are not great
because prosecutors "hold [all] the cards," acquittals are exceedingly
rare, and, at least in federal court, sentencing guidelines limit how much
they can achieve for their clients in terms of sentencing.9' When com-
pared to ordinary domestic proceedings, international criminal trials
may in fact be somewhat more contested, offering defendants a greater
chance of challenging the factual allegations and legal theories put forth
by the prosecution. 92 As Section IV.A discusses, the data on disposi-
tions of cases at the ICTY and ICTR tend to support these perceptions
of the international defense attorneys.
Many international criminal defense attorneys further believe that at
least some of their clients are innocent of the crimes with which they
were charged (or as two of my respondents clarified, "the prosecution
cannot prove they are guilty"). 93 Several responded that they believed
more than a quarter of their clients were innocent, 94 and one thought as
many as four out of his five clients were innocent.95 To some of them,
90. E.g., Brown, supra note 62, at 111-13 (making this point with respect to Ramsey Clark,
one of Saddam Hussein's attorneys). Milogevi6 technically represented himself at trial, but he was
assisted by a group of lawyers who seem to have agreed with Milogevi6's tactics of politicizing
the trial. E.g., Interview # 28, supra note 88.
91. Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1210 n.38 (2005).
92. International criminal trials may be more similar to prosecutions of white-collar crime in
the United States, where the evidence is more complex, the law is still developing, and lawyers
are more likely to expect acquittals.
93. Fifteen expressed such belief without qualifications. Eighteen others answered yes, but
only in some cases, or only on some counts, or added some other qualification. Only one respon-
dent stated that he or she did not believe his or her clients were innocent. Ten refused to respond.
94. E.g., Telephone Interview # 23, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Oct. 11, 2006) (stating his be-
lief that 25-50% of them were innocent); Telephone Interview # 14, Defense Attorney, ICTY
(Oct. 2, 2006) (stating a belief that at least 50% of his clients were not guilty); Telephone Inter-
view # 20, Defense Attorney, ICTY & ICTR (Oct. 6, 2006) (same); Interview # 10, supra note 71
(stating a belief that two-thirds of his clients were innocent); Telephone Interview # 25, Defense
Attorney, ICTR (Oct. 26, 2006) (same).
95. Telephone Interview # 11, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Aug. 28, 2006) (noting that he be-
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this belief came unexpectedly, after they became more familiar with the
facts of the case. 96 Others said they believed in their clients' "legal in-
nocence." For example, several pointed out that their clients, who were
charged under joint criminal enterprise (a mode of liability akin to con-
spiracy), were innocent because of the novelty and unacceptable breadth
of that charge.97 These and other similar explanations suggest that the
lawyers' professed belief in their clients' innocence was genuine. In
public statements and writings, other defense attorneys have reported
similar belief in their clients' innocence.98 Their views stand in contrast
to the views of criminal defense attorneys in domestic systems.
99
It should be noted that not all international criminal defense attorneys
express this belief. Ten respondents refused to answer the question of
guilt or innocence on the ground that it was irrelevant, 100 and one attor-
ney did not believe his or her client was innocent.1 ' As one of these re-
spondents remarked, he proceeds with his clients at international crimi-
nal tribunals in the same fashion as he would with his clients at home:
He thinks that 95% of them will be found guilty, but he still represents
them because he believes in the presumption of innocence and in the
importance of a fair legal process.1
0 2
These few responses aside, a great number of defense attorneys be-
lieve both that some or all of their clients are innocent and that acquittal
is possible. There are at least two ways to interpret these findings. First,
lieved four out of the five clients he represented were innocent of the crimes with which they
were charged).
96. E.g., Questionnaire # 3, supra note 72 ("To my surprise I found someone who was not
guilty of the crimes he was charged with.").
97. E.g., Questionnaire # 1, supra note 72; Interview # 11, supra note 95.
98. E.g., Anthony D'Amato, Defending a Person Charged with Genocide, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L.
459, 462-63 (2000) (noting that he had no intention of going to trial with his ICTY client if "there
was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [the client] was complicitous in the commission of
genocide" and concluding that the prosecution did not seem to have such evidence).
99. There is no survey directly on point, but anecdotal evidence suggests that defense attor-
neys in ordinary domestic cases are unlikely to believe that a significant number of their clients
are innocent. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xiv (Sweet & Maxwell 2003) (1982)
(arguing that defense attorneys know that almost all of their clients are guilty); Barbara Allen
Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 182 (1983-84); Charles J. Ogletree,
Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations To Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1239, 1248-50 (1993); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case
Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 380-81 (1994).
100. Interview # 1, supra note 73 (but also noting that he operates under a tactical assumption
that 95% of his clients are guilty, as he does in his domestic cases); Interview # 2, supra note 80
(refusing to answer question of whether his client was innocent, but later stating that when decid-
ing whether to take the case, "it was nice to know that my client was on the right side").
101. Telephone Interview # 16, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Oct. 3, 2006).
102. Interview # 1, supra note 73.
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it is quite possible that many of these defense attorneys believe that their
clients did something wrong-perhaps even criminal-but that the spe-
cific charges against the defendants are not substantiated or are
grounded in overly expansive legal doctrine. As noted earlier, one attor-
ney explained that he thought one of his clients was innocent "from the
point of domestic law," and several believed that the doctrine of "joint
criminal enterprise" under which their clients were indicted was "too
broad and ambiguous so that [a] vast number of people may be included
in it. ' 3 As I discuss later, two doctrines of liability that are now com-
monly used in international criminal law-command responsibility and
joint criminal enterprise-have been criticized by defense attorneys and
scholars alike for casting too wide a net. The prosecution's growing use
of these relatively novel doctrines may explain why so many lawyers
thought that their clients were innocent of the crimes with which they
were charged and that acquittals were possible. In addition, the diffi-
culty for the prosecution of gathering evidence abroad, often from reluc-
tant witnesses, could be another reason why many international criminal
cases appear unsubstantiated to the defense attorneys. For example, a
number of defense attorneys believed that the prosecution had not mus-
tered the evidence to prove that their clients had acted with the requisite
knowledge or intent.
0 4
It may also be that some of the defense attorneys-particularly those
from the former Yugoslavia-believe that the acts their clients commit-
ted were not really crimes, but simply unfortunate elements of fighting a
war. Certainly some outside observers have pointed to defense attorneys
using such arguments on behalf of their clients. 0 5 But if this were the
case, professions of belief in the clients' innocence might be expected to
be limited to lawyers from the country involved in the war. In fact, they
were not.' 0 6 Of lawyers who responded to the question about the guilt or
innocence of their clients, all but one of the non-Yugoslav and non-
Rwandan lawyers believed that they had some clients who were not
103. Questionnaire # 1, supra note 72; see also Interview # 11, supra note 95; Interview # 14,
supra note 94; Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77.
104. E.g., Interview # 10, supra note 71; Interview # 21, supra note 87.
105. Tina Rosenberg, Defending the Indefensible, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, § 6, at 4; Inter-
view # 6, Prosecutor, ICTY, frhe Hague, Netherlands (July 19, 2006) ("Defense attorneys, par-
ticularly from the former Yugoslavia, often find it hard to distance themselves from their clients
and from the events. They find it hard to be objective and to be balanced. They don't admit that
there were crimes, but [that] 'My guy is not responsible or he is less responsible....' Instead, their
starting point is that there were no crimes, all the crimes were committed by the other side....").
106. See, e.g., Interview # 4, supra note 41; Questionnaire # 3, supra note 72; Questionnaire #
6, supra note 79.
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guilty. 10 7 One was not certain, but thought one or two of his clients
might have been innocent; and one refused to answer the question, but
later pointed out in passing that he thought his client had been "on the
right side."' 10 8
Certainly, a belief in the client's innocence is not sufficient to prove
that a trial is not political. Plenty of defense attorneys who represent de-
fendants at show trials may believe that their clients are innocent, but
that they might be convicted anyway. But in this survey, the attorneys'
belief in the possibility of acquittal suggests that most of them think that
international criminal trials are essentially contested on the facts and the
law and are not conducted solely or even primarily for political pur-
poses.
D. Challenging the Prosecution's Facts
International criminal defense attorneys generally believe it is essen-
tial to probe into the factual allegations of the prosecution, by conduct-
ing on-site investigations, reviewing closely and promptly documents
disclosed by the prosecution, and conducting cross-examinations of
witnesses. As Michael Karnavas, an experienced international criminal
defense attorney, advises, "during the pre-trial phase, the defence law-
yer should be preparing both an attack and defence: preparing to attack,
discredit, and impeach every possible prosecution witness, while also
identifying evidence from the disclosure material and gathering evi-
dence in the field to be introduced through prosecution witnesses."'
10 9
The focus on a thorough inquiry into the prosecution's case suggests
that defense attorneys believe that acquittals based on weakness in the
evidence are possible at international tribunals and that a primary func-
tion of the defense lawyer is to uncover such weaknesses.
1. Investigating at the Scene of the Crime
The interviews suggest that virtually all defense teams conduct inves-
tigations on the territory where the crimes were committed, and that de-
fense attorneys usually consider this to be an essential aspect of their
representation. It seems to occur in nearly all cases. Defense attorneys
107. This number does not include those attorneys who refused to answer the question. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text.
108. Questionnaire # 6, supra note 79 (selecting this as a factor that he found "most discour-
aging" in his initial decision to become an international criminal defense attorney).
109. Michael G. Karnavas, Gathering Evidence in International Criminal Trials-The View
of the Defence Lawyer 26 (Apr. 7, 2006) (manuscript, on file with author).
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also typically hire one or more expert witnesses in each of their cases.
The ICTY and ICTR provide the defense with financial support for at
least one investigator and approximately 150 hours of expert pay per
case. 110 This greatly facilitates more in-depth investigations than one
finds in ordinary domestic cases.1 ' The interviews also suggest that
some international criminal defense attorneys continue with their inves-
tigations even after exhausting the resources provided by the tribunals,
which affirms their belief in the importance of an inquiry into the
facts. 1 12
In public statements, defense attorneys regularly emphasize the cen-
trality of in-depth factual investigation. As Steven Kay, a prominent in-
ternational criminal defense attorney, writes, visits to the crime scene
are "necessary to familiarize the lawyer with the areas that feature in the
evidence of the case, to check the accuracy of evidence relied upon by
the prosecution and to search for evidence that is relevant to the de-
fence."' 1 3 Another veteran defense attorney, John R.W.D. Jones, con-
firms that investigation is "an extremely important issue, for cases are
won and lost on facts, and those facts, or at least the evidence relating to
those facts, are uncovered in the pre-trial, investigative phase of the
proceedings."
1 14
110. See John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defence Counsel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON
ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 167, 174 (Rich-
ard May et al. eds., 2001) (observing that defense teams typically have one legal assistant and one
investigator); Sylvia de Bertodano, What Price Defence? Resourcing the Defence at the ICTY, 2
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 503, 504 (2004) (observing that the ICTY now provides, as a matter of
course, for up to three legal assistants and investigators); Karnavas, supra note 109, at 19 n.64
(commenting that expert pay is limited to about 150 hours per case); Rohde, supra note 67, at 592
(noting that an individual expert's working hours, not including court testimony, will typically be
limited to between five and thirty hours); id. at 566 (noting that defense teams have hired a wide
variety of experts, most notably military and medical experts).
111. For example, data on New York City defense attorneys suggests that they hire experts or
interview witnesses in roughly 20% of their cases. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense
Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1602-03
(2005). A study of Phoenix attorneys found that only 55% of them visited the crime scene before
a felony trial. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1734-35
(1992-93).
112. Karnavas, supra note 109, at 22; Interview # 3, supra note 78; Telephone Interview # 13,
Legal Assistant, Defense Team, ICTR (Sept. 26, 2006); Interview # 14, supra note 94.
113. Kay & Swart, supra note 9, at 1423-24; see also Caroline Buisman et al., Trial and Er-
ror-How Effective Is Legal Representation in International Criminal Proceedings?, 5 INT'L
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) ("Routinely the cases are so complex and factually diverse that counsel
is required to take the initiative and go in search of evidence that casts doubt on the prosecution's
case.").
114. John R.W.D. Jones, The Gamekeeper-Turned-Poacher's Tale, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
486, 488 (2004); cf ...And Serious Reform, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 16, 1997, at 6 (citing Michail
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In the interviews for this study, defense attorneys similarly pointed to
the importance of allowing for the time and resources necessary to in-
vestigate the facts.'l 5 Consistent with a belief that factual investigation
is a critical part of their work, a few defense attorneys even placed their
own safety in peril in order to obtain testimony in support of their cli-
ents' factual claims." 6 Further, the attorneys cited two aspects of pre-
trial investigation as among their most serious concerns with interna-
tional criminal practice: 1) the difficulty of obtaining cooperation from
governments and witnesses in gathering evidence; 117 and 2) the frequent
failure by tribunals to reimburse attorneys for necessary investigation
into the facts (which has lead a number of attorneys to spend their own
money to provide an adequate defense).1 8 Along the same lines, the in-
terviewees expressed concern that the "Completion Strategy" of the tri-
bunals has limited the time and resources that they have to investigate
the facts and prepare a defense." 9
Wladimiroff, counsel for Dugko Tadi6 at the ICTY); Tim Cuprisin, Area Lawyer Defending Ser-
bian at UN Tribunal Accuses His Client of War Crimes Against Muslims, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 1995, at B3; Elizaphan Ntakirutimana (Interview with Ramsey Clark), INT'L
JUST. TRIB., June 22, 2004 (pointing to the importance of gathering witness testimony in Rwanda
and lamenting the obstruction of evidence collection by the Rwandan government).
115. The majority of respondents thought that lack of resources interfered with either their or
their colleagues' representation of clients. This was the view of nine of the attorneys who practice
at the ICTR, twelve of the attorneys who practice at the ICTY, and six of the attorneys who prac-
tice at both ICTY and ICTR. By contrast, four ICTR and seven ICTY attorneys did not believe
that lack of resources was a serious problem in their work.
116. Interview # 5, Legal Assistant, Defense Team, ICTR (July 12, 2006); cf Questionnaire #
11, supra note 77 (noting that the defense makes "all sacrifices to ensure under very difficult and
sometimes risky circumstances that the trials and verdicts attain a certain degree of legitimacy").
117. See, e.g., Karnavas, supra note 109, at 20 (reporting difficulties that defense attorneys
have experienced in locating witnesses to testify for the defense and in obtaining cooperation
from government authorities); Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77 (noting that defense counsel
"confronts all forms of obstacles in having access to witnesses or even granted missions to travel
to locate witnesses"); see also Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Decision on
Juvenal Kajelijeli's Motion for Protective Measures for Defense Witnesses, 3 (Apr. 3, 2001)
(reporting intimidation and murder of defense witnesses); Press Release, Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda, Defence in 'Military I' Trial Begins Today (Apr. 11, 2005) (reporting defense wit-
nesses' reluctance to testify out of fear).
118. Eight ICTR attorneys, three ICTY attorneys, and two attorneys working at both tribunals
mentioned instances in which they thought the Registry had refused to reimburse legitimate ex-
penses they had incurred in the course of their work. Cf Karnavas, supra note 109, at 22 (noting
that because of inadequate funding for pretrial investigations, "defence teams before the ad hoc
International Tribunals are invariably faced with either working for free for several months in
order to be ready for trial or to stop working and go to trial unprepared"); Prosecutor v. Milutino-
vi6, Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional
Funds (Nov. 13, 2003).
119. The "Completion Strategy" includes the measures the Tribunals have adopted, under
pressure from the UN and other donors, to finish their work by 2010. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc.
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2. Reviewing Documents Disclosed by the Prosecution
Defense attorneys also emphasized the importance of reviewing
documents disclosed by the prosecution for gaps, inconsistencies, and
other potentially exculpatory evidence. Some of the interviewees com-
plained that the prosecution was reluctant to reveal exculpatory evi-
dence 12 and that when such evidence was revealed, this occurred just
before or during trial, leaving the defense little time to review it ade-
quately. 121 One defense attorney writes that the ICTY prosecution
"takes a rather disdainful attitude towards its obligation to collect evi-
dence that may be exculpatory for the defence, even if aware of the ex-
istence of such information.'' 22 Some attorneys noted, however, that
more recently, prosecutors have fulfilled their obligation to reveal ex-
culpatory evidence more scrupulously.
123
Even when the prosecution does disclose evidence, defense attorneys
protest that the prosecution reveals thousands of pages of documents at
once, letting the defense sort out on its own which documents might be
relevant or exculpatory. 124 They argue that such disclosure often occurs
too close to trial, leaving them without the time and resources to inves-
tigate the facts adequately. As one attorney remarks, in such situations,
''requests to the Registrar for additional funds are likely to be met with
skepticism, followed by a bureaucratic memo-writing obstacles
S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). A number of defense attorneys are very concerned that judges have
curtailed defendants' rights in an attempt to fulfill the deadlines set by the Completion Strategy.
E.g., Interview # 4, supra note 41. The Association of Defence Counsel has raised this issue re-
peatedly; in its latest report, it noted that "[tihe Completion Strategy also places undue burden on
the Tribunal, with a real danger of impacting on the fairness of the trials.... An example of such
pressure is that cases that in the circumstances require more time for preparation and presentation
are not awarded such time." ASSOCIATION OF DEFENCE COUNSEL AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://www.adcicty.org/documents/defenceannualreport.pdf [hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL REPORT].
120. E.g., Interview # 11, supra note 95; Interview # 23, supra note 94; Interview # 28, supra
note 88.
121. E.g., Interview # 11, supra note 95.
122. Karnavas, supra note 109, at 13.
123. E.g., Interview # 10, supra note 71.
124. Karnavas, supra note 109, at 13 ("Just imagine being served with hundreds or even
thousands of pages of new disclosure material, in the form of witness statements or documents,
right before trial, or in the middle of the trial, or just before closing argument, or even while the
appeal is pending after the submissions of the briefs.... [M]ore often than not, the defence does
not have the funds to react to the situation completely."); id. at 14 n.44 (reporting similar re-
sponses to a questionnaire sent to defense attorneys at the ICTY and ICTR on the topic of prose-
cutorial disclosure); see also Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 197 (Apr.
19, 2004) (ordering the ICTY Prosecutor to investigate complaints that the prosecution had failed
to comply with its disclosure obligations).
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course." 125 Some attorneys believe that delayed disclosure is an inten-
tional tactic by the prosecution, designed to overwhelm them and ex-
haust their resources. 126 With the recent introduction of an electronic
disclosure system, this issue should diminish somewhat.' 27 Regardless
of how the disputes over prosecution disclosure are ultimately settled,
the concern that defense attorneys express over this issue shows their
commitment to a thorough inquiry into the prosecution's evidence.
3. Challenging Hearsay Evidence and Insisting on Cross-
Examination
Defense attorneys at the international tribunals-even if they come
from civil-law countries-also stress the importance of cross-examining
prosecution witnesses at trial. The typical international criminal defense
attorney pictures the ideal role for himself as being "in court doing a
devastating cross-examination, impeaching witness after witness with
document after document, incrementally obliterating the prosecution's
case."'128 In reality, defense attorneys are constrained from implement-
ing this ideal, and this is a source of frustration for many of them.
Hearsay evidence is generally admissible at the ICTY and ICTR, as
long as the out-of-court statements are relevant, probative, and reli-
able. 129 The inability to cross-examine the person who made the state-
ments, and "whether the hearsay is first-hand or more removed," may
affect the trial chamber's view of the probity of the evidence. 130 But
hearsay evidence "is not inadmissible per se"; rather, it must be consid-
ered "with caution.' 13 1 As part of their "Completion Strategies," the
ICTY and ICTR have amended their rules and begun allowing written
witness statements even more liberally. 132
Defense attorneys see the increased use of witness statements without
the opportunity for cross-examination as a major source of unfairness in
current trials before the ICTY. One interviewee opined that this new ap-
125. Karnavas, supra note 109, at 13.
126. Id. at 21-22.
127. Under this disclosure system, the prosecution places relevant disclosure material in elec-
tronic form, and the defense may search the material by keyword. Id. at 22 (noting the promise
and the limits of the electronic disclosure system).
128. Id. at 1.
129. E.g., Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Decision Regarding Statement of a De-
ceased Witness, 23 (July 21, 2000).
130. Id.
131. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgment, 25 (June 8, 2000).
132. Ari S. Bassin, Note, "Dead Men Tell No Tales ": Rule 92 Bis-How the Ad Hoc Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals Unnecessarily Silence the Dead, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1777 (2006).
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proach by the tribunal will leave a stain on its legacy.' 33 Putting words
into actions, attorneys have filed numerous motions challenging the ad-
missibility of out-of-court statements.' 34 In its publications, the Associa-
tion of Defense Counsel for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia (ADC-ICTY) has expressed its disagreement with
the broader admissibility of written witness statements, noting that this
practice prevents both defense attorneys and judges from questioning
the witness making the statement and evaluating the witness's credibil-
ity.
13 5
There is more than one explanation for why defense attorneys are so
concerned about pre-trial investigation opportunities and cross-
examination. For one, defense attorneys may be used to conducting ex-
tensive investigations and cross-examination at home, and they may
simply be conditioned to expect the same at the international level. This
is unlikely to provide a full explanation, however, since around 60% of
the attorneys at the ICTY come from the former Yugoslavia, which has
an inquisitorial procedural system, where defense attorneys neither con-
duct their own investigations, nor cross-examine witnesses. Among the
remaining attorneys, many come from other civil-law countries with
similar traditions.
Another possible explanation is that defense attorneys are paid more
if they spend more time investigating facts and then cross-examining
witnesses in court. But this is unlikely as well. The ICTY has switched
to a lump-sum payment system under which the Registry decides in ad-
vance each case's category of complexity and apportions remuneration
for attorneys accordingly.' 36 How strenuously defense attorneys investi-
gate or cross-examine afterwards is not likely to induce the Registrar to
change the category of a case. Even at the ICTR, where attorneys are
still paid per hour, it is unlikely that defense attorneys have a financial
incentive to engage in more thorough investigations. First, much of the
investigatory work is done by an investigator, not by the attorney. More
importantly, there is a monthly cap on both the investigators' and the
133. Interview # 4, supra note 41.
134. E.g., Prosecutor v. Blalkid, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 36 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prose-
cutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay (Aug. 5, 1996).
135. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 119.
136. International Criminal Court, Report to the Assembly of States Parties on Options for
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attorneys' working hours.' 37 Another reason to believe defense lawyers
reap no financial gain from this practice is that many of the respondents
complained that the Registrar refused to reimburse them for legitimate
work-related expenses, and some noted that they had to spend their own
money to pursue the investigation adequately. 3
8
The most likely explanation for the concern with thorough investiga-
tions and cross-examinations, then, is that defense attorneys believe that
international criminal trials are, and should be, vigorously contested on
the facts. If defense attorneys thought their clients had no good factual
defenses, they would probably focus their energy on other ways to gain
victory-relying more heavily on procedural tactics to obtain charge
dismissals, bargaining to get lower sentences for their clients, or chal-
lenging proceedings on purely legal or political grounds. The fact that
attorneys continue to insist on having greater resources for investigation
and more opportunity for cross-examination is at least some indication
that they believe that in a good percentage of cases, there are facts they
could successfully contest.
E. Challenging Expansive Liability Doctrines
Defense attorneys believe that they have an important role to play in
limiting overly expansive interpretations of international criminal law,
especially to the extent that these interpretations conflict with the prin-
ciple of individual culpability. In interviews, defense attorneys have ex-
pressed concerns about the expansive use of command responsibility, 39
and joint criminal enterprise 140 by the international criminal tribunals,
and, in their pleadings, they have regularly challenged the application of
these doctrines to their clients.' 4' The Association of Defense Counsel
practicing before the ICTY submitted an amicus brief on the issue of
joint criminal enterprise, contesting its broad use by the tribunal. 42
Under the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE), an individual
may be held responsible for all crimes committed pursuant to a common
137. Id. at 8.
138. See supra notes 116-18.
139. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 105, § 6, at 4 (noting concerns about command respon-
sibility by Anthony D'Amato, law professor and lawyer for an ICTY defendant).
140. E.g., Interview # 11, supra note 95.
141. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text; see also Steven Powles, Joint Criminal
Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 606, 614-15 (2004).
142. Amicus Brief of Association of Defence Counsel-ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case
No. IT-99-36-A (July 5, 2005) [hereinafter Brdanin Amicus Brief] (on file with author).
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plan or design that involves the commission of an international crime, if
the individual participates with others in the common design.1 43 The
most controversial version of this doctrine is the so-called "Category
III," or "extended," joint criminal enterprise. Under this doctrine, if the
prosecution shows that the defendant intended to participate in the
common plan, the defendant will be liable for crimes committed by oth-
ers that he did not intend, as long as those crimes were foreseeable. 144
Some chambers have interpreted foreseeable to mean "objectively fore-
seeable," meaning that the defendant could be convicted even for crimes
he did not himself foresee. 45 As commentators and defense attorneys
have noted, these interpretations lower the mental state required for cul-
pability to recklessness, or in the case of the "objective foreseeability"
test, to negligence.146 The Association of Defence Attorneys at the
ICTY has criticized the doctrine as too broad and "susceptible to over-
reaching and abuse."' 14 7 Many national systems have also rejected such
extended application of criminal liability; even in the few countries that
accept liability for crimes that fall outside the scope of the common
plan, such liability has often been criticized as guilt by association. 148
Despite the controversy surrounding joint criminal enterprise, it has
been used extensively by the prosecution at international criminal tribu-
nals. At the ICTY, 64% of the indictments filed between June 25, 2001,
and January 1, 2004, relied explicitly on joint criminal enterprise and
about 81% can be read to rely on it implicitly.1 49 As of December 2007,
63 out of 130 ICTY indictments, or 48%, explicitly relied on joint
criminal enterprise. 50 At the ICTR, the number is much lower-as of
December 2007, only thirteen out of eighty-five indictments were based
on JCE.151 But the ICTR prosecution makes up for this by instead bas-
143. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, 94-101 (Feb. 25, 2004).
144. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 195 et seq. (July 15, 1999).
145. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, Judgment, 203-04 (May 21, 1999).
146. E.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 38, at 108-09; Interview # 11, supra note 95.
147. Brdanin Amicus Brief, supra note 142, at 3.
148. Danner & Martinez, supra note 38, at 109.
149. Id. at 107-08.
150. This figure does not include indictments withdrawn before or after transfer to the Tribu-
nal or the indictments of persons reported deceased before trial. The calculations are based on the
ICTY Fact Sheet listing the status of the accused and on a review of indictments on the ICTY
website. For the ICTY Fact Sheet, see ICTY at a Glance: Key Figures,
http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index-t.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
15 1. This figure does not include ICTR indictments that were withdrawn or the indictments of
persons reported deceased before trial. It also does not include information about two accused
who are at large and whose indictments are not available on the ICTR website. The calculations
are based on an ICTR Status of Cases list and on a review of indictments available on the ICTR
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ing indictments on conspiracy to commit genocide-fifty-five out of
eighty-five indictments at the ICTR, or 65%, included a conspiracy
count. 152
Not surprisingly, the extensive use of JCE, particularly at the ICTY,
has drawn numerous challenges by defense counsel. Originally, defense
attorneys mounted a broad attack on joint criminal enterprise, on the ba-
sis that there is no provision for it in the ICTY or ICTR statutes. They
argued that, because the drafters of these statutes made no mention of
this mode of liability, it did not come within the tribunals' respective ju-
risdictions, and its use violated the prohibition on retroactive criminal
laws. 153
Since the ICTY rejected this broad challenge, defense attorneys have
focused on limiting the application of joint criminal enterprise.1 54 Some
have argued that while joint criminal enterprise may be generally avail-
able to ICTY and ICTR prosecutors, if applied to their client, it would
violate the principle of individual criminal liability.1 55 For example, de-
fense attorneys have opposed charges of joint criminal enterprise in
cases where the crimes were committed "structurally or geographically"
remotely from the accused.156 In interviews, defense attorneys similarly
argued that extending JCE to cover crimes committed over a large geo-
website. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Cases: Status of Cases,
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
152. Id. By contrast, at the ICTY, where genocide indictments are few in number, counts of
conspiracy to commit genocide (the only conspiracy charge available at the international criminal
tribunals) are also few-they appear in only eight out of 130, or in about 6%, of the indictments.
The calculations are based on the ICTY Fact Sheet listing the status of accused and on a review of
indictments on the ICTY website. See ICTY at a Glance: Key Figures,
http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index-t.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
153. E.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise, 1 34 (May 21, 2003).
154. E.g., Brdanin Amicus Brief, supra note 142, at 3 ("The ADC-ICTY has viewed with
alarm the Appeals Chamber's creation and expansion of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise
("JCE"). The ADC-ICTY disagrees with, but accepts as binding precedent, the decision in Tadi6
that JCE was part of customary international law, and the decision in jdani6 that JCE is included
in Article 7(1) despite its omission from the language of the Statute."). In that brief, the ADC ar-
gued that the Appeals Chamber should uphold the Trial Chamber's holding that the physical per-
petrator of a crime must be a member of the joint criminal enterprise in order for other members
of the JCE to be held liable for the crime.
155. E.g., Prosecutor v. 1 ermak, Case No. IT-03-73-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion
Seeking Leave To Amend the Indictment, 50 (Oct. 19, 2005); Prosecutor v. Prli, Case No. IT-
04-74-PT, Decision To Dismiss the Preliminary Objections Against the Tribunal's Jurisdiction,
8 (Sept. 26, 2005).
156. Karemera v. Prosecutor, Case Nos. ICTR-98-44-AR72.5, ICTR-98-44-AR72.6, Decision
on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 2, 11 (Apr. 12, 2006).
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graphical area would amount to strict liability and be unfair to the de-
fendant. 1
57
Defense attorneys have also repeatedly contested the lack of clarity in
indictments that charge joint criminal enterprise. They have argued that
indictments are ambiguous about the scope and nature of the alleged
joint criminal enterprise and about which part of the joint criminal en-
terprise is attributable to their client. 5 8 In response to these challenges,
the Trial Chambers occasionally have made the prosecution amend the
indictments,159 but defense counsel maintain that these changes occur
too late in the proceedings to allow them to respond adequately.
Similarly, defense attorneys actively have contested prosecutorial re-
liance on command responsibility, another form of "imputed liability or
criminal negligence."' 160 Command responsibility (also known as supe-
rior responsibility) is alleged in the vast majority of indictments at the
international criminal tribunals-64% of ICTY and 73% of ICTR in-
157. Interview # 25, supra note 94 (observing that JCE started as a common purpose doctrine
which held that people who were acting jointly in a mob or lynching group could be convicted for
actions by others in the group, but that it is now applied very broadly so people who are in gov-
ernment are held responsible for actions by people whom they do not know and who are geo-
graphically distant from them); see also Karemera, Case Nos. ICTR-98-44-AR72.5, ICTR-98-44-
AR72.6, Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 17 (addressing this con-
cern by the defense by noting that "[t]hird category JCE liability can be imposed only for crimes
that were foreseeable to an accused. In certain circumstances, crimes committed by other partici-
pants in a large-scale enterprise will not be foreseeable to an accused. Thus, to the extent that
structural or geographic distance affects foreseeability, scale will matter, as the Appellant sug-
gests it should").
158. E.g., Prosecutor v. Stanisid, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Defence Motions Re-
garding Defects in the Form of the Second Amended Indictment (Apr. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Rasevid, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Todovi6 Defence Motion on the Form of the Joint
Amended Indictment (Mar. 21, 2006); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, De-
cision on Tharcisse Muvunyi's Motion for Judgement of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis, 8
(Oct. 13, 2005) (arguing that no evidence was presented as to the defendant's joint criminal en-
terprise liability under Article 6(1); by pleading "everything but the kitchen sink," the Prosecution
has failed to inform the accused of the exact nature and cause of the allegations against him);
Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-I, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Mo-
tion Objecting to the Form of the Amended Indictment, 5 (July 15, 2004) (arguing that the in-
dictment does not contain sufficiently precise factual allegations relating to joint criminal enter-
prise and therefore the accused has not received due notice of the details imputed to him).
159. E.g., Prosecutor v. (ermak, Case No. IT-03-73-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion
Seeking Leave To Amend the Indictment (Oct. 19, 2005); Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No.
ICTR-2001-73-1, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion Objecting to the Form of the
Amended Indictment (July 15, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sagahutu, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision
on Sagahutu's Preliminary, Provisional Release and Severance Motions (Sept. 25, 2002).
160. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Se-
curity Council Resolution 808, 56, U.N. Doc. S/25704/ADD.l (May 19, 1993).
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dictments. 16' The doctrine allows the finding of individual liability
where the following four elements are met:
(i) an act or omission incurring criminal responsibility.. .has been
committed by other(s) than the accused...; (ii) there existed a su-
perior-subordinate-relationship between the accused and the
principal perpetrator(s)...; (iii) the accused as a superior knew or
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such crimes or had done so...; and (iv) the accused as a superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such crimes or punish the perpetrator(s) thereof.... 62
Command responsibility does not require that the superior share the in-
tent of the principal perpetrators of the crime; rather, what is important
is that the superior knew or had reason to know that such crimes were
being or were about to be committed. One of the most controversial
elements of this doctrine has been the definition of "reason to know,"
and in particular, whether it introduces a form of strict liability or ordi-
nary negligence.' 63 Commentators and drafters of the international
criminal tribunal statutes have debated this issue at length, 64 and even
Trial Chambers from the ICTR and the ICTY have disagreed on this
point. 65
During oral argument, one ICTY defense attorney called command
responsibility "one of the most contested issues in proceedings before
this Tribunal.' 66 In fact, defense attorneys have actively challenged the
161. See supra notes 150-51 for a discussion of the sources for these figures.
162. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, T 294 (June 30, 2006).
163. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 38, at 127.
164. See id. at 128-30; see also Mijan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibil-
ity, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (2001); WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 106-07 (2004).
165. Compare Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 489 (Sept. 2,
1998) (requiring that negligence be so serious as to amount to "malicious intent"), with Ori6,
Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, 294 (noting disagreement with this position by ICTY Trial and
Appeals Chambers), and Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgment, 27 &
n.31 (pointing to the use by the Trial Chamber of "gross negligence" as one of the bases for
command responsibility), and Prosecutor v. Blagki6, IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 562 (Mar. 3, 2000)
(concluding that the accused was responsible "on the basis of his negligence, in other words for
having ordered acts which he could only reasonably have anticipated would lead to crimes").
166. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, Transcript, at 4337 (July 4, 2000); see also
John R.W.D. Jones et al., The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Defence Perspective, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 211, 223 (2004) (noting that the doctrine remains a "controversial one" and that it
"allows a person to be held guilty of an intentional crime.. .where his mens rea may have been no
more than merely negligent").
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use of this mode of liability. 167 Some defense attacks on command re-
sponsibility have been broad-based, arguing that the doctrine was not
part of international law when the alleged crimes were committed.
1 68
Defense attorneys practicing at the Special Court for Sierra Leone also
have argued that the doctrine is controversial because it allows the con-
viction of a person for an intentional crime "where his mens rea may
have been no more than merely negligent."' 69 These attorneys have
therefore suggested that it would be "greatly preferable if a separate
crime of 'failure to prevent or punish' were criminalized at the interna-
tional level, rather than holding a commander responsible for a grave
crime, such as crimes against humanity, when he has perhaps done
nothing more than non-intentionally fail to punish crimes."1 70 Since
broad challenges to command responsibility have failed at the ICTY and
ICTR, more recently defense counsel have focused on limiting the ap-
plication of the doctrine in particular cases.'1 71
167. But see, e.g., Interview # 11, supra note 95 (noting that he does not consider command
responsibility to be problematic, or at least not as problematic as joint criminal enterprise). Schol-
ars have generally concurred that the ICTY's interpretation of command responsibility is less ex-
pansive and troublesome than its interpretation of joint criminal enterprise. See Danner & Marti-
nez, supra note 38, at 146-47.
168. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to
Jurisdiction (Nov. 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Krajignik & Plavgi6, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT,
Transcript, at 20 (July 19, 2000); Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision on the De-
fence Motion To Strike Portions of the Amended Indictment Alleging "Failure to Punish" Liabil-
ity (Apr. 4, 1997).
169. Jones et al., supra note 166, at 223.
170. Id. at 224.
171. E.g., Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, 297-99 (June 30, 2006) (re-
jecting the defense's argument that a superior is responsible "only if [his] subordinates 'commit-
ted' the crimes themselves, and not if they merely aided and abetted the crimes of others");
Prosecutor v. Perisid, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions, 27, 31 (Aug.
29, 2005) (rejecting the defense's argument that "Article 7(3) requires a subordinate to have
'committed' criminal acts and that 'committing' means physically perpetrating the crime");
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Decision on Kajelijeli's Motion for Partial
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis (Sept. 13, 2002) (rejecting defense argument that the defendant
was not responsible as a superior because he lacked dejure authority over the Interhamwe mili-
tia); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Transcript, 4303 (Mar. 23, 1999) ("[T]he
Defence allows for the possibility of a civilian individual also coming under the notion of com-
mand responsibility. But, Your Honours, only in exceptional cases and only with regard to that
civilian who is ranked sufficiently high up on the hierarchy of power and authority so that
through the force of his position he is able to issue binding orders to military personnel."); Prose-
cutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion To Strike Para-
graphs 20 and 22 and All References to Article 7(3) as Providing a Separate or an Alternative
Basis for Imputing Criminal Responsibility, B (Mar. 2, 1999) (rejecting the defense's argument
that "even if Article 7, paragraph 3, provides for command responsibility, it cannot be pleaded in
the alternative to a charge under Article 7, paragraph I").
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Defense attorneys are probably wise to direct their attention to chal-
lenging these expansive theories of liability under international criminal
law. At the ICTR, conspiracy and complicity have been two of the most
common grounds for charge dismissals and acquittals. 172 At the Nurem-
berg Tribunal and during negotiations of the International Criminal
Court Statute, too, conspiracy was a very contested issue.'73 At the
ICTY, five of the nine full acquittals so far have been based on the fail-
ure of the prosecution to establish the defendant's responsibility as a su-
perior; 74 four of these defendants had also been charged-but their
guilt was ultimately not proven-under the joint criminal enterprise
doctrine. 175 Indictments relying on command responsibility and joint
criminal responsibility have fared poorly at the ICTR as well, leading to
dismissals or acquittals on these charges in about half of the cases. 1
76
F. Pursuing a Fair Trial
When asked to select from a list the most important goals of interna-
tional criminal trials, 177 defense attorneys most commonly chose "pro-
viding a fair trial to the defendant."' 178 This answer was even more fre-
quently chosen when the question was which goals of international
criminal trials the defense has a role in promoting. 179 The next-most
172. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
173. Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1559, 1592 (2006).
174. The five are Zejnil Delali6, Sefer Halilovi6, Fatmir Limaj, Isak Musliu, and Miroslav
Radi6.
175. The four are Sefer Halilovi6, Fatmir Limaj, Isak Musliu, and Miroslav Radi&
176. This number is not very reliable when it comes to joint criminal enterprise, however, be-
cause only two cases charging JCE were completed at the ICTR as of December 2007. Compare
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Judgment (Dec. 13, 2005) (finding the defen-
dant guilty of participating in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide and extermination),
with Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-01-65, Judgment (Sept. 12, 2006) (finding that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant participated in a joint
criminal enterprise to commit genocide and extermination). By contrast, ten out of the eighteen
completed ICTR cases relying on command responsibility led to dismissals or acquittals on that
charge.
177. The interviewees were asked to select the goals from a list that contained the following
possibilities: a) providing a fair trial to the defendant; b) promoting the rule of law in communi-
ties affected by the conflict that is subject of the trial; c) promoting peace and reconciliation in
communities affected by the conflict that is subject of the trial; d) creating an accurate historical
record; e) deterring future violations of international criminal law; f) incapacitating the defendant;
g) rehabilitating the defendant; h) providing retribution to the victims; i) helping victims heal; j)
other.
178. Twenty-five of the forty-four respondents stated that this is an important goal of interna-
tional criminal trials.
179. Respondents were nearly unanimous in stating that the defense has an important role in
2008] DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TRIALS
commonly chosen answers to this second question were: "creating an
accurate historical record," 180 "promoting the rule of law in the affected
communities," 181 and "deterring future violations."
' 182
Overall, the attorneys consistently emphasized that their foremost
duty was to provide a fair trial to their client and that any other goal was
incidental.1 83 Some stated that defense attorneys who intentionally pur-
sued other goals might hurt their own clients. 84 In the end, most of the
respondents would probably agree with the description by Mark Drumbl
(himself formerly a defense attorney in Rwanda) of the role for the de-
fense in genocide trials in Rwanda: to "promote the objective interests
of justice by ensuring that the accused be fairly judged as an individual
for the crimes he or she actually committed" '85 and to reduce the influ-
ence of "[q]uestions of collective redemption and political retribution"
in the courtroom. 186 As one attorney noted, "[W]ithout the defense, [an
international criminal tribunal] is going to be political, it will not be
based on evidence."
'1 87
promoting the goal of a fair trial for the defendant. But see Interview # 2, supra note 80 (noting
that defendant has the right to a fair trial, but that it is not his duty to ensure that; his duty is to get
his client acquitted).
180. Seventeen respondents stated that this was an important goal for the defense to promote.
Three specifically disagreed with this proposition.
181. Twelve respondents stated that this was an important goal for the defense to promote.
Two specifically disagreed with this proposition.
182. Thirteen respondents stated that this was an important goal for the defense to promote.
One specifically disagreed with this proposition.
183. E.g., Interview # 18, supra note 75 ("The role of the defense is not to promote recon-
ciliation or such things, but to promote justice for the indicted person.... Of course, indirectly you
support all the other goals."); Interview # 23, supra note 94 ("Defense counsel should still have
primary duty to the client. By advancing the client's rights, you should advance the system. [But
you are also] obliged not to mislead the court and to bring international justice into disrepute.");
Telephone Interview # 27, Defense Attorney, ICTR (Nov. 2, 2006) ("The defense has one main
goal-to do anything legally possible to defend the interests of his client. You have to do it within
the law and within the rules, but you don't have any obligation either towards the victim or who-
ever. The system is built that way."); Questionnaire # 7, supra note 74 ("Promoting a fair trial for
the defendant is the essential role for the defense attorney, because he is the only one that plays
such a role [at the trial]. As for [promoting the rule of law and promoting peace and reconcilia-
tion], the defense can play a role as a counterweight to the court and the prosecution.").
184. E.g., Interview # 26, supra note 88 ("The role of the defense lawyer is to have primary
loyalty to the client.... Can't have a dual loyalty-promote truth and reconciliation and promote
the client's interests at the same time. It's not possible.").
185. Mark Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's
Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 547 (1998).
186. Id. at 547.
187. The interviewee added: "If it was not for the defense at the ICTY, they would be saying
Bosnia was a genocide. And it wasn't." Telephone Interview # 17, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Oct.
5, 2006).
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Many attorneys also chose promoting the rule of law in the affected
communities and creating an accurate historical record as important
goals that the defense can promote. When providing an explanation of
their answers, the attorneys who chose these goals stated that a con-
tested trial may produce a more accurate historical record because it
puts the prosecution's case to the test and presents facts from the defen-
dant's perspective as well. 188 Similarly, they thought that a trial that is
fair to the defendant is more likely to leave a positive legacy for the rule
of law in the affected communities; it is in this sense, they explained,
that the defense could play an important role in promoting the rule of
law. 189 In other words, many defense attorneys believe that a contested
trial is consistent with two of the arguably political purposes of trial-
promoting the rule of law and building an accurate historical record.
But when promoting a fair trial for their client and some of these
broader political goals conflict, attorneys focus on the goal of fair trial.
A couple of examples illustrate this point. The first example comes from
the way defense attorneys treat victim-witnesses on the stand. They
generally opt for aggressive cross-examination, even where this may in-
terfere with the healing process of the victim. As discussed earlier, a key
purpose of international criminal trials is to provide a forum for victims
to tell their stories and achieve a sense of closure in the process. With
this in mind, prosecutors and judges at times allow victims to go beyond
the testimony that is strictly relevant to the charges against the defen-
dant so as to give victims the opportunity to tell their stories.1 90 Defense
attorneys, unsurprisingly, are less sympathetic to the victims' needs to
testify at length, particularly when such testimony is likely to be damag-
ing to the defendant.
Most attorneys interviewed for this study stated that they would not
refrain from aggressive cross-examination simply to facilitate the heal-
188. See Interview # 11, supra note 95 (noting that the defense can ensure trial is not a one-
sided story); Interview # 14, supra note 94 (stating that the clash of adversaries promotes the
truth); Telephone Interview # 19, Defense Attorney, ICTY, Oct. 6, 2006 (arguing that the defense
can help set the record straight); Interview # 20, supra note 94 (noting that the defense can ensure
certain evidence is considered). But see Interview # 4, supra note 41 (pointing out that this may
be a side result of defense role, but, in general, expressing skepticism of the notion that adversar-
ial trials produce the truth).
189. E.g., Interview # 4, supra note 41; Interview # 11, supra note 95; Interview # 13, supra
note 112; Interview # 15, supra note 86.
190. At the same time, victim-witnesses and some commentators have criticized the ICTY for
not allowing more such testimony and thus silencing witnesses. Dembour & Haslam, supra note
46, at 158-65; see also STOVER, supra note 18, at 10.
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ing process of the victim or to prevent further trauma to the victim. 19 '
As one pointed out, "You can't think of whether you're going to hurt
that person's feelings; you should represent your client in the best
way. ' 92 Another explained that he might hesitate to impeach or aggres-
sively cross-examine a victim only because of the effect that such tac-
tics might have on the judges:
The decision would be a strategic one.. .whether impeachment of
that particular witness would be weighed against the rest of the
trial with credibility of the judge. I would not lay back simply
because I know they were telling the truth or because they might
be traumatized. It's not a consideration. But the effect on judges
of a witness being traumatized-that's a case-by-case strategic
decision., 
93
Like the attorney quoted above, many of the respondents further stated
that, if this helped their client, they would impeach the credibility of a
witness whom they believed to be testifying truthfully.1 94 The majority
of these respondents emphasized that their belief as to the witness's
191. See, e.g., Interview # 27, supra note 183 ("You can have a person testifying truthfully,
but badly. My role is not to protect the victim, but to protect my client. So if I can make [the wit-
ness] look like a liar, even if he's telling the truth, I will do it, as long as I am within the legal
boundaries. I would not introduce a false document, but if the person is simply testifying badly,
yes."). But see Interview # 20, supra note 94 (noting that if there is something that is not neces-
sarily accurate and must be highlighted, the attorney will do that, but will approach it in a careful
manner. The last thing I want to do is re-traumatize a traumatized victim"); Interview # 28, supra
note 88 ("1 would not try to discredit the witness, but I might try to bring out points in my favor,
but if [for example] my client said it happened, I would not try to discredit [the witness]. [That's]
totally unethical.").
192. Telephone Interview # 24, Defense Attorney, ICTY (Oct. 16, 2006).
193. Interview # 16, supra note 101. Many defense attorneys stated that they are careful not
to alienate the court by needlessly attacking a testifying victim. E.g., Interview # 10, supra note
71 ("A good lawyer would never cause distress to a prosecution witness unnecessarily. This
would alienate the finders of fact."); Interview # 17, supra note 187 ("[Y]ou don't do that in these
courts; you don't get to be aggressive with these witnesses and everything is through interpret-
ers.... Judges are incredibly protective of the witnesses."); Interview # 21, supra note 87 ("1 will
not [cross-examine aggressively a victim who may be retraumatized or whom I know to be testi-
fying truthfully]. It's a question of strategy."). The Association of Defence Attorneys at the ICTY
has even held training sessions on the topic of cross-examining victim-witnesses in a sensitive
way. Interview # 20, supra note 94.
194. E.g., Interview # 1, supra note 73; Interview # 2, supra note 80; Interview # 4, supra
note 41; Interview # 10, supra note 71; Questionnaire # 3, supra note 72; Questionnaire # 4, su-
pra note 78; Questionnaire # 6, supra note 79. Almost all of the attorneys who answered yes to
this question either practiced or had received extensive training in the common-law tradition.
Civil-law attorneys were less likely to say they would impeach a witness whom they believed to
be testifying truthfully.
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credibility was irrelevant; what mattered were the instructions from the
client on this issue. 195
Studies of witness testimony at the international criminal tribunals
confirm that attorneys regularly try to impeach the credibility of victim-
witnesses. Eric Stover documents such defense attempts in a number of
cases at the ICTY. 196 A 2002 report on the treatment of witnesses at the
ICTR also notes with concern the aggressive cross-examination to
which the witnesses were subjected:' 97
[T]hey had been treated with scorn, considered to be liars, cheats,
mentally disturbed or fools, and feeling that they, in turn, had
been accused. A number of witnesses had been asked if they had
been paid to testify, whether Ibuka, Avega,198 or the government
had asked them to say one thing or another, or were criticized for
195. The following response is representative:
[T]hat question makes my blood boil. It is just not a question of my belief It really
isn't; it's just a question of instructions from my client.... [M]y belief as to whether that
someone is lying is completely irrelevant.... They may be the victim of the worst, the
most horrific rape, but if my client is running some defense that they consented to this
horrific rape, and that is the issue in the case, I am going to have to suggest to this poor
unfortunate person that they are lying, that they consented to it, that they were happy to
engage in this activity. That is what I get paid to do; it is not a very nice aspect of the
job, but what I think about it is irrelevant, completely irrelevant.
Interview # 1, supra note 73; see also Interview # 2, supra note 80 ("[Y]ou never know if some-
one is speaking the truth or not.... I am just taking a position, a position of my client. Basically, if
he thinks [the witness] is lying, it doesn't matter what I think is true."); Interview # 4, supra note
41 ("It would be a horrible disservice to my client if I substituted my judgment for that of the
judges. It is not my job to judge [the credibility of the witness]; it's the judge's job."); Question-
naire # 3, supra note 72 ("[W]hat I believe is neither here nor there-I am there to advance a cli-
ent's case. I am not permitted to mislead the court, of course.").
196. E.g., STOVER, supra note 18, at 57 ("In his cross-examination of Emil Cakali6 and Dra-
gutin Berghofer, [defense attorney] Fila questioned whether the two men-Cakali6 with his
blood-smeared face and Berghofer with his poor vision--could under the circumstances really
have recognized his client in the dimly lit building."); id. at 67 (In the Celebidi trial, "[d]efense
attorneys harangued witnesses, claiming that they had been coached and exposed to the testimony
of prior witnesses by Serbian victims rights groups."); id. at 89 (noting that the testimony of
Benazija Kolesar, a head nurse at Vukovar hospital, "passed without incident, and she left the
stand feeling proud of what she had accomplished. Then, unexpectedly, the presiding judge called
her back to view a video that the defense claimed would disprove her earlier statements. Although
the defense's attempt to discredit her failed, this time she left the room feeling angry and con-
fused"); id. at 10, 129-30; see also Dembour & Haslam, supra note 46, at 166 (giving example of
a defense attempt to destroy credibility of a victim-witness). But cf id. at 168 (observing that "in
the Krsti6 trial, most of the evidence offered by the victim-witnesses was not contested under
cross-examination").
197. INT'L FED'N FOR HUM RTS., VICTIMS IN THE BALANCE: CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 14-15 (2002), available at
http://www.fidh.org/afriq/rapport/2002/rw343a.pdf [hereinafter VICTIMS IN THE BALANCE].
198. Ibuka and Avega are Rwandan organizations of genocide survivors.
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not being present at the scene when the events occurred.1 99
The examination of victim-witnesses is one clear example of the ten-
sion between political and adjudicative elements of international crimi-
nal trials. Vigorous cross-examination can easily re-traumatize victim-
witnesses, but at the same time, it is an essential tool for defense attor-
neys to contest the facts presented by the prosecution. While it is in ten-
sion with the goal of providing closure and healing for victims, this de-
fense tactic brings trials closer to their adjudicative function.
The second example of defense actions moving trials away from the
political and closer to the legal model is when defense attorneys contest
the admissibility of evidence they consider irrelevant to the charges
against their clients. In an effort to provide a more complete historical
record and to allow victims to tell their stories in court, the prosecution
frequently files overly long indictments and then also attempts to intro-
duce evidence beyond that necessary to support the charges.200 But as
discussed earlier, the admission of such evidence is often contrary to the
adjudicative model of war crimes trials, which demands a focus on the
specific charges leveled against the defendant.20 1
The defense attorneys interviewed for this study were nearly unani-
mous that they would object to the introduction of any evidence that is
not directly relevant to the charges against their clients. Most would do
so even if they did not perceive any direct threat to their client's case
from the introduction of the evidence and even if the evidence might aid
the compilation of a historical record or the healing of victim-witnesses.
As one attorney succinctly explained, "My job is not helping build a
historical record, it's defending the accused., 20 2 Another added that it
would be "a dereliction of duty" not to challenge evidence that is not di-
199. VICTIMS IN THE BALANCE, supra note 197, at 8. A study of witnesses at the ICTY also
found that many of the witnesses "worried about how they would respond under cross-
examination. Most of all, they dreaded being questioned about the truthfulness of their presenta-
tion. They feared that the defense would try to "trick" them, especially over dates and times of
events that took place years earlier." STOVER, supra note 18, at 85.
200. See Assessment and Report of Judge Fausto Pocar, U.N. Doc. S/2006/353, Annex I
(2006) (observing that trials at the ICTY have been long because indictments have been complex
and indictments have been complex because of the prosecution's obligations to victims); O-Gon
Kwon, The Challenge of an International Criminal Trial as Seen from the Bench, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 360, 373 (2007) (noting that the prosecution has been unwilling to reduce the
charges in indictments, in part because of its obligations to victims and in part because of its be-
lief that it is the Tribunal's duty to compile an accurate historical record); see also Prosecutor v.
Simba, Case No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Judgment, 38-39 (Dec. 13, 2005) (finding that the prose-
cution's evidence relating to one of the charges was "unnecessarily cumulative").
201. E.g., ARENDT, supra note 10, at 5, 18; Dembour & Haslam, supra note 46, at 151-52.
202. Interview # 15, supra note 86.
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rectly relevant to the charges against the client, but may help build the
historical record.2 °3
Almost all respondents protested that prosecutors regularly try to in-
troduce testimony and documents that go beyond the scope of the in-
dictment.24 On the other hand, studies of ICTY witnesses show that
these witnesses believe prosecutors and judges do not do enough to help
them to give a full account of the crimes they suffered and of the his-
torical and political context in which the atrocities occurred.205 What is
clear is that defense attorneys regularly object to the introduction of
evidence that goes beyond what is strictly necessary to prove the spe-
cific charges against the accused.20 6 Although a fuller examination of
transcripts is necessary to evaluate more precisely how often this oc-
203. Interview # 14, supra note 94. The following response is representative:
I have to challenge everything.... Somehow they lost sight what the original purpose
of the tribunal was-to determine individual guilt. You indict certain people that were
individually involved. Who started the war is not at issue. You could have been on the
defense and still have committed war crimes. Tribunals are not a forum to find historical
truth. If you don't challenge something in the indictment, you will read it in the judg-
ment as if it's the gospel truth. They will be using it to establish joint criminal enter-
prise, which may put your client in a very disfavorable light and may augment the sen-
tence.
Interview # 20, supra note 94.
204. See, e.g., Interview # 21, supra note 87 ("1 [object to such evidence] almost every day....
Most of the evidence is context evidence, very often not accurate, not directly relevant to my cli-
ent."); Interview # 22, supra note 84 ("The prosecution tactic is 'let's put as much evidence as
possible, so the Trial Chamber will find whatever suits it.' The time frame and the geographical
frame of the indictment-they are starting with the first day of creation of Earth, and they are
ending with the Dayton agreement. They should concentrate on a couple of critical weeks or
months."); Interview # 24, supra note 192; Interview # 25, supra note 94 ("[This happens] every
day in trial in Arusha. I think they are introducing it because the indictment is not very good, so
they want to go beyond the indictment.... The court is not at all sympathetic to these [our] chal-
lenges. They feel that they will weigh everything at the end of the case, so they want to admit
everything and decide at the end."); Interview # 26, supra note 88 ("They [the prosecutors] try to
bury you in background evidence."); Interview # 28, supra note 88. But see Interview # 18, supra
note 75 (respondent did not find he had to make such objections, but this was probably because at
that point in the ICTY's operations, most background evidence had already been introduced).
205. STOVER, supra note 18, at 87, 129-31; Dembour & Haslam, supra note 46, at 158-59,
163-64.
206. For examples of motions contesting the introduction of such evidence, see Prosecutor v.
Ndayambaje, Case No. ICTR-98-42-0622, Requete d'Elie Ndayambaje aux Fins de Certification
d'Appel de la Decision Intitul~e: Decision on Ndayambaje's Motion for Exclusion of Evidence,
du I Septembre 2006 (Sept. 6, 2006); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Decision on
the Admission of Prosecution Exhibits 27 and 28 (Jan. 31, 2005); Nyiramasuhuko v. Prosecutor,
Case No ICTR-98-42-AR73.2, Decision on Pauline Nyiramsuhuko's Appeal on Admissibility of
Evidence (Oct. 4, 2004); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-0 1-76-1, Decision on Defence Mo-
tion To Disqualify Expert Witness, Alison des Forges, and To Exclude Her Report (July 14,
2004).
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curs, it seems clear that defense attorneys have reduced the extent to
which the trials serve the goals of helping victims and building a his-
torical record and have instead shifted the focus more directly to the
question of individual guilt.
G. Refusing To Make Political Arguments
The trial can be used for demonstrative purposes not only by the
prosecution and judges, but also by the defense. This might be an attor-
ney's own decision, or it might be based on a request by the defendant.
If either the defendant or his attorney believes that the prosecution or
the judges have politicized the trial, it would not be surprising for the
defense itself to launch into political arguments. Similarly, if defendants
foresee little chance of acquittal or mitigated sentence-whether be-
cause the trial is a show or because the evidence against them is irrefu-
table-they would seem more likely to resort to political speeches and
attacks because legal arguments would be of no avail. As the trial of
Saddam Hussein most recently showed, this defense strategy receives
much media attention and is therefore commonly associated with war
crimes trials. Yet the interviews and a review of pleadings suggest that
defense attorneys at the ICTY and ICTR turn to political arguments
relatively rarely. With the exception of a few high-level defendants,
such as Slobodan Milogevi6 and Vojislav Segelj, defendants and their
attorneys generally refrain from seeking to turn trials into political
events.
Before examining the extent to which the defense chooses to make
political arguments, it is important to distinguish between a political at-
tack and a legal challenge to the tribunal's legitimacy. Although the line
between the two is often rather thin, I am using the term "political ar-
gument" to mean an argument that not only lacks reasonable objective
legal merit, but which is addressed to an audience outside the court-
room-either for purposes that have nothing to do with the trial itself
(for example, to buttress the electoral chances of supporters of the de-
fendant), or for the purpose of bringing outside political pressure on the
tribunal itself. By contrast, some legal challenges to the authority of the
tribunal have greater legal merit, and cannot be viewed as entirely po-
litical in nature.
An example of a non-frivolous challenge to the tribunal's legality is
that made by Dugko Tadi6, the first defendant at the ICTY. Tadi6 and
his attorneys challenged the ICTY's establishment as inconsistent with
the Security Council's powers under the UN Charter and with certain
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requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. °7 The Appeals Chamber rejected this challenge in a thorough,
reasoned opinion.20 8 It would be reasonable to expect subsequent defen-
dants to lodge the same objection for purposes of protecting the record.
But highly vocal and strenuous challenges to the tribunal on the exact
same grounds that the Appeals Chamber has rejected, such as those
made by Vojislav Segelj and Slobodan Milogevi6, have acquired the
tone of relatively more political, and relatively less legal, attacks.209 It
appears that their primary aim is to obstruct the proceedings and to in-
fluence public opinion in Serbia.210
Both the interviews and the research of trial transcripts and motions
reveal, however, that such political challenges to the international
criminal tribunals are rare. To some degree, the decision not to politi-
cize trials is one made by the defendants themselves. But it is also a re-
sult of defense counsel's deliberate strategy of relying on the facts and
the law to present their cases. The attorneys I interviewed overwhelm-
ingly stated that, even if their clients asked them to make a political ar-
gument, they would refuse to do so. 211 Many also said they would coun-
207. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
208. Id.
209. E.g., Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel's
Motion To Lift Confidentiality Status of Certain Pleadings and Medical Reports, Tab 4, 29-30
(June 1, 2006) (citing to some of Miloievi6's statements against the Tribunal, such as "I consider
this Tribunal of yours to be illegal because it is not based on the Charter of the United Nations....
I consider this so-called Tribunal to be a means of war against my country, which is still going
on," as well as a reference to the Trial Chamber as a "joint criminal enterprise"); Prosecutor v.
Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Request of the Accused for an Opinion of Trial
Chamber II on Professional Arguments Challenging the Legitimacy of the International Tribunal
(May 13, 2005) (noting "that the Accused has already challenged the lawfulness of the establish-
ment of the Tribunal by the Security Council on exactly the same grounds" and that "the Appeals
Chamber has already ruled upon the lawfulness of the establishment of the Tribunal by the Secu-
rity Council in the Tadi6 Jurisdiction Decision").
210. The language used by these defendants also suggests a fundamental disrespect for the le-
gal process and the tribunal as an institution. E.g., Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on
Assigned Counsel Motion To Lift the Confidential Status of Certain Pleadings and Medical Re-
ports, Tab 4, 29-30 (noting that the defendant referred to the Trial Chamber as a "joint crimi-
nal enterprise"). And as Milogevi6 himself freely admitted, his main goal at trial was to influence
an audience outside the courtroom. See Marlise Simons, The Hand That Feeds Milosevic's De-
fense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 1, at 10 (quoting Milogevi6 as saying: "[T]he only reason I
agreed to participate in this case of yours is because I want to be able to address the public.").
211. Of the twenty-two interviewees who responded directly to this question, eighteen said
they would not make a political argument, even if their client asks them to do it. The answers of a
number of attorneys responding to this question were ambiguous, but some of them implied that it
would be strategically unwise to make political arguments, and others simply stated that they
could not respond to the hypothetical (they added that the question did not arise in their case, be-
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sel clients not to try to make such arguments themselves on the witness
stand,2t 2 and a few asserted they would refuse to represent a defendant
who plans to politicize the trial.213 Indeed, a review of transcripts and
decisions available in the ICTY and ICTR databases on Westlaw reveals
few cases in which defense attorneys made a political argument or ac-
cused the tribunal of being biased.
It is likely that, when defense attorneys refrain from political argu-
ments, they are simply making a strategic decision. 21 4 Once they see
that courts are not receptive to political arguments and that these argu-
ments may in fact hurt their clients' cause, defense attorneys may sim-
ply choose the wiser strategy of adhering to the law and the facts of the
case. Indeed, some interviewees--defense attorneys as well as prosecu-
tors-suggested that defendants had resorted to political arguments
more frequently in the early days of the ICTY. The attorneys may there-
fore have adapted to the court's preferences over time.
There may be other explanations for the relatively non-political na-
ture of the proceedings at the international tribunals. In particular, the
distance of the international tribunals-and more importantly, of their
judges and lawyers-from the communities that were involved in the
conflict being adjudicated may be the critical factor that allows these
lawyers to stay out of politics. 21
5
Whatever the explanation, the fact is that defense attorneys generally
do not perceive international tribunals as a pulpit from which to launch
political tirades. Instead, they use the law and the facts to make their
points and win cases.
cause the client had not asked them to make political arguments).
212. Of the sixteen interviewees who responded directly to this question, only two would al-
ways let their client make the argument; ten would advise the client against it; and four would not
let the client make such an argument.
213. Interview # 10, supra note 71; Interview # 17, supra note 187; Interview # 24, supra
note 192.
214. E.g., Interview # 10, supra note 71 (noting that judges do not like political arguments);
Interview # 13, supra note 112 (noting that such arguments are generally useless).
215. In this sense, defense attorneys interviewed for this study are different from Bosnian
judges and prosecutors interviewed by a team of researchers at the Berkeley War Crimes Center.
The views of those judges and prosecutors toward the ICTY correlated with their ethnicity-
Bosnian Muslims typically found the Tribunal to be fair, while Bosnian Serbs typically thought
the ICTY to be political and biased. But as the researchers observed, most respondents, who were
still practicing in their home country, were generally not familiar with the procedures and rulings
of the Tribunal. The researchers found that those who had interacted with the Tribunal had over-
come their initial skepticism toward it. Harvey Weinstein & Laurel Fletcher, Justice, Accountabil-
ity, and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 102 (2000).
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H. Recognizing Political Elements of International Criminal Trials
As the previous Sections discussed, defense attorneys do not gener-
ally view trials at the ICTY and ICTR as political events, and they do
not themselves try to politicize the proceedings. Yet some of the re-
spondents did point to elements of ICTY and ICTR trials that they
thought were unduly political and unfair to defendants.
Of the forty-four interviewees, nine believed that trials in at least one
of the tribunals were significantly politicized and slanted in favor of the
prosecution.21 6 Of these nine, seven practiced predominantly at the
ICTR or aimed their comments specifically at the ICTR. This means
that the percentage of ICTR defense attorneys who believed that trials
were politicized was higher than the percentage of ICTY practitioners
who held such beliefs.217
Four other respondents made comments that indicated a belief that
politics intervened on some occasions, but as a whole, their responses
did not reveal a clear view that politics played a decisive role. 2'8 Finally,
isolated comments from a number of other respondents suggested a be-
lief that, in various ways, the prosecution received better treatment than
the defense at the tribunals. But because these comments did not indi-
cate that this was a result of political considerations, I did not consider
them to be evidence for the view that the trials are political. Finally,
even among the minority of defense attorneys who viewed the trials as
political, only a few believed political arguments by the defense to be a
proper reaction. 2
19
When defense attorneys talked about the political aspects of interna-
tional criminal trials, they typically attributed this politicization to one
or more of the following features: 1) the tribunals were created by the
Security Council for political reasons; 2) their jurisdiction was defined
in a biased manner, and/or the process of appointing the judges was po-
216. Interview # 4, supra note 41; Interview # 10, supra note 71; Interview # 12, supra note
72; Interview # 28, supra note 88; Interview # 29, Defense Attorney, ICTR (Aug. 9, 2007); Ques-
tionnaire # 7, supra note 74; Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77; Questionnaire # 17, supra note
84; Questionnaire # 19, Defense Attorney, ICTR (Nov. 15, 2006).
217. Twenty-six of the total forty-four interviewees have represented defendants at the ICTY,
while twenty-four have represented defendants at the ICTR.
218. Interview # 15, supra note 86; Interview # 21, supra note 87; Interview # 25, supra note
94; Questionnaire # 9, Defense Attorney, ICTR (July 11, 2007).
219. Of the nine respondents who saw the trials as essentially political, only three viewed po-
litical arguments as a proper defense tactic. Interview # 28, supra note 88; Questionnaire # 7, su-
pra note 74; Questionnaire # 19, supra note 216. Of the four respondents who pointed to certain
political elements in the trials, only one would make political arguments in response. Question-
naire # 9, supra note 218.
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litical; 3) prosecutors preferred charges selectively, targeting certain
ethnicities for political reasons, and at times engaged in objectionable
tactics that rendered the proceedings unfair; 4) the Registry treated the
defense unfairly and did not provide it with adequate resources; and 5)
individual governments prevented the attorneys from providing effec-
tive defense, and the tribunals did not do enough to counter these gov-
ernments' improper influence on the process.
The establishment of the ICTY and ICTR by the Security Council
was seen by some as a feature that impaired the legitimacy of interna-
tional trials.220 An attorney working at the ICTR noted that the "tribu-
nals are creatures of the UN, and there is political pressure from
Rwanda and from all kinds of levels., 221 Another ICTR attorney further
argued that "courts like ICTR were set up by foreign powers that were
complicit in the conflict and [were] intended to be victor's courts. 222
Yet a third had an even more poignant critique about how politics at the
establishment still affected the functioning of the ICTY and ICTR:
[B]oth tribunals are political organizations and justice is not their
goal. The Security Council created them to put out a false history
of what happened in those wars; to cover up the role of [the] US,
Great Britain and allies in those wars, and to justify the present
regimes in those countries. [They were] set up really for propa-
ganda purposes and not for judicial purposes. If you study their
financing, who controls them, who staffs them, you would come
to the conclusion that they are not independent.
223
Indeed, a review of ICTY and ICTR pleadings suggests that in sev-
eral cases, the defense objected to the validity of the tribunals' estab-
lishment by the Security Council, even after the Appeals Chamber had
resolved this issue in Prosecutor v. Tadi62 24 and Prosecutor v. Kanya-
220. Interview # 10, supra note 71.
221. Interview # 26, supra note 88; see also Interview # 10, supra note 71 ("There was a defi-
nite sense that the UN had hurried through by going to the Security Council, rather than the UN
as a whole... [It was] making up for failing to respond to desperate cries for help.").
222. Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77.
223. Interview # 28, supra note 88. He explained further what he thought were the political
motivations behind the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR:
In the case of Yugoslavia, it was the last socialist country in Europe, and there were
other reasons-[such as access to] oil supply routes. Rwanda was also a socialist coun-
try; not important in itself, but it is a doorway to the Congo, which is hugely important
in terms of resources. [It was about the] ability to control Congo; getting an access point
to invade the Congo and that was Rwanda and Uganda.
224. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
2008]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
bashi.225 Defense attorneys have challenged the tribunals' establishment
on the same grounds in about ten cases since then.2 26
On a related point, a couple of respondents worried that the process
of electing the judges may interfere with the judges' impartiality during
trial. As one respondent explained:
[Because judges are elected by the UN General Assembly, they
are] subject to political pressure. When their term is up, they [the
General Assembly] can get rid of them.... In the UN everything
is done with diplomacy, so [the judges] can't offend anybody....
A defendant like my client... there would be tremendous pressure
on the tribunal if he is acquitted.227
Finally, two attorneys pointed out that the political nature of the
courts' creation influenced the definition of their jurisdiction and the
goals of those working for the tribunals, making acquittals almost im-
possible. One attorney believed that the temporal and subject-matter ju-
risdiction at the ICTR had been defined in a way that placed the burden
of proof on the accused. 228 Another spoke of the "born-again prosecuto-
rial ethos" that came out of the definition of the tribunals as entities to
"prosecute" rather than "adjudicate" international crimes. 29
Several attorneys also pointed to specific examples of what they re-
garded as bias in the prosecution. For example, a few attorneys com-
plained that no members of the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
were indicted at the ICTR. Tutsis were the main victims of the genocide
in Rwanda, and the current members of the government are predomi-
nantly Tutsi and supporters of the RPF. Several attorneys argued that
ICTR prosecutors should have charged the RPF with crimes against
225. Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Jurisdiction (June 18, 1997).
226. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR 96-10, ICTR 96-17-T, Judgment
and Sentence (Feb. 21, 2003). Two defendants, Segelj and Milogevi6, brought up this issue more
than twice, suggesting a political motive. E.g., Prosecutor v. Seelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Deci-
sion on the Request of the Accused for an Opinion of Trial Chamber II on Professional Argu-
ments Challenging the Legitimacy of the International Tribunal (May 13, 2005).
227. Interview # 26, supra note 88; see also Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77 (observing that
"[t]he entire process of appointment ofjudges is political").
228. Questionnaire # 8, Defense Attorney, ICTR (June 29, 2007).
229. Interview # 10, supra note 71 ("The ICTY and ICTR have always been in my view
prosecutorial entities. You can see that in their founding documents...'Tnibunals to prosecute per-
sons responsible....' They should instead be described as courts to try the accused. It is not
merely semantics. You do get a more born-again prosecutorial ethos at the tribunals than you do
in domestic courts.").
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humanity and not focused solely on crimes committed by Hutus.23 °
These arguments echoed a number of public statements by ICTR de-
tainees. 23  At the ICTY, too, some alleged selective prosecution and
complained that prosecutors were not as strict with their charges against
Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims as they were with Serbs. 232 One attorney
also complained that former ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour had re-
fused to charge NATO with war crimes for the bombing of Serbia,
while issuing a political indictment against Milogevi. 233
At the ICTR, several defense attorneys also accused the prosecution
of putting on the stand perjurious witnesses. One stated that he was ab-
solutely convinced in the innocence of his client, as well as in the inno-
cence of certain other defendants at the ICTR.234 He argued that most of
the witnesses testifying for the prosecution were convicted or about to
be convicted in Rwanda and were ready to say anything on the stand to
avoid a death sentence or life imprisonment in Rwanda.235 A few attor-
neys also accused the Rwandan government and certain Rwandan vic-
tims' organizations of encouraging witnesses to testify falsely.236
230. Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77 ("Note that not a single Rwandan of Tutsi ethnic
group has been indicted before that court [the ICTR] despite admissions by the Rwandan authori-
ties [of] crimes against humanity and war crimes and overwhelming evidence implicating senior
members of the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)"); see also Interview # 26, supra note 88 ("Al-
leged victims who were the Tutsis, and they now run the country, and then they killed four to five
million of people in the Congo, allegedly to kill Interahamwe. If it's not a genocide, but it's crime
against humanity.").
231. In April 2004, ICTR detainees sent a letter to the United Nations, arguing that the ICTR
was "conducting political trials where victor's justice reigns over the principles of justice and
fairness" because it had failed to investigate crimes committed by Tutsi government officials. 10
Years After the Genocide, Detainees Make Negative Assessment of the ICTR, HIRONDELLE NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 7, 2004,
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826c 12564cf004f793d/925b4cfad00a68c
Oc 1 256820007a56b7?OpenDocument.
232. E.g., Interview # 21, supra note 87; Interview # 28, supra note 88.
233. Interview # 28, supra note 88 ("[Milogevid's] indictment was clearly political. It was
nonsense, [they were] mainly designed to be propaganda pieces. [They] don't read like indict-
ments in the US; they read like a story. [There was] no evidence against him; if you follow tran-
scripts, in fact, there was a lot of evidence in his favor; really what happened was different from
what the media presented.").
234. Questionnaire # 10, supra note 72.
235. Id.
236. Id.; Interview # 26, supra note 88 ("We see a lot of lying and perjuries. Witnesses come,
brought by victims' organizations like Ibuka. The witnesses don't answer questions of counsel,
and even when you catch them lying, judges don't intervene. You have all these secret witnesses
testifying under pseudonyms. Supposedly for the protection of witnesses, but that's hogwash. If
they testified publicly, I could get exculpatory information-people telling me the witness was
not where he said he was, etc.").
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Perhaps the most common complaint among respondents was that the
lack of resources given to the defense and the lack of cooperation from
certain governments and witnesses prevented attorneys from providing
effective representation.237 This, in the eyes of several attorneys, pro-
duced injustice at the tribunals. 8
[At the ICTY] the problem is that defense counsel is in opposi-
tion to the tribunal, we are almost considered criminal by the tri-
bunal.... The main way in which we are in opposition is the Reg-
istry. It pays for the defense, so it is in complete control on
defense counsel action. They consider that they have the right to
make our choice of assistant and so on, to impose one way of
working.239
At the ICTR, defense attorneys went on a strike to protest, among other
things, the Registry's refusal to pay certain defense expenses. 240 As one
attorney explained, "There is not sufficient budget to pay the lawyers.
That contributed to the strike, too. The cutting of our bills...telling us:
'You can't charge for this or that. You've spent two hours reading
documents and you should have spent only thirty-five minutes.' ' 241 But
this attorney, as well as a few others who complained about lack of re-
sources, added that "this has changed, because people at the Registry
have changed.,2 42 Several also acknowledged that abuses by some de-
fense attorneys were partly to blame for the excessive scrutiny of de-
fense expenses by the Registry.243
Several ICTR attorneys further complained that the Rwandan gov-
ernment interfered both with their efforts to collect evidence and with
the court's operations. As one attorney explained:
237. E.g., Interview # 10, supra note 71; Interview # 15, supra note 86; Questionnaire # 12,
Defense Attorney, ICTR (Aug. 6, 2007).
238. See, e.g., Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77 ("There is no equality of arms between the
prosecution and the defense in terms of resources allocated to prepare a fair and equitable proc-
ess.... Also, defense counsel is seen often as an intruder in the system. He is underpaid and goes
for several months without remuneration.... [I]n many circumstances the Registry has cited lack
of resources as a reason for not paying or for reducing to ridiculous amounts the remuneration
due to me. Also, many fee assessment and finance officials who are responsible for fee assess-
ment and payment are lay men.... Yet they assess legal work and at times demand details which
violate the confidentiality of the client's case....").
239. Interview # 2 1, supra note 87. The same attorney added that the Registry had a negative
attitude towards the defense.
240. Press Statement, ICTR, Registry's Response to the Allegations of Serious and Repeated
Violations of the Rights of the Defence, ICTR/INFO-9-3-15.EN (Jan. 29, 2004).
241. Interview # 26, supra note 88.
242. Id.; see also Interview # 10, supra note 71.
243. E.g., Interview # 10, supra note 71; see also ICC REPORT, supra note 136, at 9.
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[T]here is political pressure from Rwanda and from all kinds of
levels. The government of Rwanda has a special representative to
the court. When he sees things that he does not like, they put
pressure on the tribunal. You are familiar with the case of Baray-
agwiza. Rwanda put pressure on the prosecution and on the tri-
bunal.... In 2004, lawyers made a strike over pressure from
Rwanda to transfer the accused to Rwanda.
' 244
Again, this echoes criticism by ICTR defendants themselves. In 2001,
twenty-eight ICTR detainees went on a hunger strike, arguing that the
Rwandan government's interference rendered trials "increasingly politi-
cised" and unfair.245
Many ICTR lawyers also stated that the Rwandan government hin-
dered the defense's efforts to gather witness testimony. According to
several respondents, potential witnesses refused to speak to the defense
because they were afraid that the Rwandan government would retaliate
against them if they were to testify for the defense at the ICTR.246 The
following type of accusation against the Rwandan government was
made by more than one attorney: "People were assassinated because
they disagreed with the Kagame administration. There was a lot of re-
taliation. So the witnesses are afraid they would be killed or would be
put on a genocide list by the Rwandan government.,
247
Some attorneys also complained that the Rwandan government inter-
fered with their work more directly, by accusing the defense or their in-
vestigators of having committed crimes, and in some cases, actually jail-
ing the investigators.248 One attorney concluded that "[t]he lack of
244. Interview # 26, supra note 88.




246. E.g., Questionnaire # 8, supra note 228; Questionnaire # 10, supra note 72.
247. Interview # 26, supra note 88.
248. Questionnaire # 10, supra note 72 ("[J]'ai 6t6 accus6 par ces mmes autoritds d'avoir su-
born un t~moin du procureur pour obtenir une declaration en faveur de mon client. Beaucoup
d'autres Avocats ont fait l'objet de cette accusation avant moi. Actuellement un Avocat Rwan-
dais, qui 6tait Enqu~teur dans une dquipe de defense, croupit dans une prison au Rwanda, inculp6
de la meme accusation. La vdrit6 est que ces autoritrs craignent que la defense utilise les m~mes
m~thodes ddloyales qu'elles pour obtenir des t~moignages mensongers contre des innocents.") ("I
was accused by these same authorities to have suborned prosecution witnesses to give false testi-
mony favorable to my client. Many other attorneys had been similarly accused before me. Cur-
rently, a Rwandan lawyer, who was an investigator for one of the defense teams, is rotting in a
Rwandan prison, charged with the same crime. The truth is that the [Rwandan] authorities are
afraid that the defense is using the same unfair methods that they [the Rwandan authorities] have
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cooperation from the Rwandan government and interference in the judi-
cial process has eroded the credibility of the ICTR. This has reinforced
the perception that the ICTR is a victor's court.,
2 4 9
The issues raised above are serious and could threaten the legitimacy
of trials at the ICTY and ICTR. They help explain why several respon-
dents thought that acquittals were impossible for political reasons. But
with the exception of the complaints about lack of resources and lack of
cooperation from the Rwandan government, the defense views dis-
cussed in this Section belong to a minority of the respondents. Most at-
torneys interviewed for this study regard the proceedings at the ICTR
and ICTY as generally fair and apolitical, and genuinely contested, The
next Part explains why this might be the case and then discusses why a
minority of defense attorneys might think otherwise.
III. EXPLAINING DEFENSE VIEWS
A. Explaining the Predominant Belief That Trials Follow the
Adjudicative Model
1. Role-Bound Attitudes
The fact that a large majority of defense attorneys regards interna-
tional criminal trials as genuine factual and legal contests suggests that
these trials do, in fact, serve primarily the legal purpose of assessing in-
dividual responsibility. Still, it is possible that the attitudes of defense
attorneys simply reflect the attorneys' understanding of their profes-
sional role-to win a victory for their clients by challenging prosecuto-
rial factual assertions and legal theories.
Defense attorneys everywhere work on behalf of clients and owe a
duty to these clients to advance the best argument possible on their be-
half. Different systems attach different weight to that duty relative to the
attorneys' duties to the court and the law.250 But in all systems, a crimi-
nal defense attorney is hired to advance the client's case vigorously and
to rebut prosecutorial legal theories and factual assertions, if possible.
been using to obtain false testimony against innocent defendants.") (author's translation); see also
Questionnaire # 9, supra note 218.
249. Questionnaire # 11, supra note 77.
250, See JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN tN His ORIGINAL DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE 15-
26 (2001); David Luban, The Sources of Legal Ethics: A German-American Comparison of Law-
yers Professional Duties, 48 RABELSZEITSCHRIFT 245, 266-67 (1984).
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These expectations may provide at least a partial explanation of why de-
fense lawyers perceive the international criminal trial as a contested
event, in which acquittals are possible and some defendants are in fact
not guilty. As attorneys internalize their role of faithful representatives
of their clients' interests, it may be easier for them to serve that function
if they believe in and profess the innocence of their clients. It may also
be easier for them to justify their decision to leave a comfortable prac-
tice at home and represent widely abhorred defendants if they believe
that they are likely to win some of their cases.
If the attorneys are part of a tight-knit community of professional
peers, they are especially likely to internalize these professional norms.
While international attorneys are much more dispersed than their do-
mestic counterparts, in recent years they have become a closer legal
community. A good number of the attorneys are now repeat players. At
least at the ICTY, the Association of Defense Counsel has served as an
important social network and a representative of defense interests.
These peer ties have probably reinforced the self-identification of de-
fense attorneys as zealous advocates. For most attorneys, this identifica-
tion is also based on long experience with representing criminal defen-
dants at home.t
There is another way in which the legal training of defense attorneys
influences their attitudes. Their education and work experience in an ad-
judicative model of criminal trials has instilled in them a respect for the
rule of law and a reluctance to resort to political arguments. A number
of respondents thus explained that they would not make political argu-
ments during trial because this is not behavior befitting a good law-
yer. 2 And in fact, the most virulent political attacks on the interna-
tional criminal tribunals have come from two self-represented
defendants-Slobodan Milogevi6 and Vojislav Segelj-who did not feel
as constrained by professional norms as their advocates might have
been.
While the professional identity of defense attorneys undoubtedly
shapes their attitudes, it is unlikely that they entirely misperceive the na-
ture of international criminal trials. After all, many domestic defense at-
torneys continue to fulfill their duty of zealous advocacy without believ-
ing that acquittals are likely or that many of their clients are innocent.
As discussed below, other factors may influence the attitudes of interna-
tional criminal defense attorneys.
251. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
252. E.g., Questionnaire # 12, supra note 237.
583
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. Effect of Participating in International Criminal Trials
Participation in international criminal trials likely influences the
views of defense attorneys in at least two ways. First, defense attorneys'
views undergo a transformation when the attorneys begin to perceive
themselves as players in the international criminal tribunals. Second, the
particular procedural rules used by the tribunals further shape defense
beliefs and actions at trial.
As defense attorneys begin to work at the tribunals and to see them-
selves as key players in the proceedings, some evidence suggests that
skepticism toward those proceedings is likely to decrease. A 1999 study
of Bosnian lawyers and judges reported a transformative effect in a case
where the participants' interaction with the ICTY was in fact much
more limited. While the study showed that ethnicity influenced the re-
spondents' views on the presence of politics at ICTY trials, it also found
that those respondents who had had personal exposure to the ICTY
tended to overcome their initial skepticism and develop respect for the
tribunal and its lawyers.253
A similar transformation may occur among defense attorneys at the
ICTY and ICTR. As they learn first-hand about the operation of the tri-
bunals and become involved in the proceedings, preexisting beliefs that
they may have of the tribunals as political entities are likely to dissipate.
One interpretation is that defense attorneys are simply "co-opted" by the
tribunals as their pay and case assignment become at least somewhat
dependent on tribunal officials. A more charitable view would be that
the attorneys' participation in the proceedings teaches them about the
different ways in which they can influence the trial proceedings and
convinces them that they are in fact engaged in an adjudicative enter-
prise.
This effect is likely to be strengthened by the largely adversarial pro-
cedures at the international tribunals. Under the adversarial system, de-
fense attorneys have greater procedural powers and responsibilities than
they do in an inquisitorial setting. 54 They cannot rely on the state to
seek out exculpatory evidence 255 and must instead conduct their own
pre-trial investigation. 256 At trial, the prosecutor and the defense, rather
than the court, take charge of presenting evidence and examining wit-
253. Weinstein & Fletcher, supra note 215, at 147.
254. Luban, supra note 56, at 139.
255. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
256. Maximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53
AM. J. CoMP. L. 835, 851 (2005).
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nesses. 257 The rules thus set up the trial as a battle between the defense
attorney and prosecutor. Under this framework, both the prosecution
and the defense may naturally view their role as "mak[ing] one's own
case as strong as possible and... weaken[ing] the case of the other
party. 258 Defense attorneys operating under this framework naturally
internalize the ideal of vigorous adversarial defense, under which they
have both the ability and the duty to challenge factual and legal claims
by the prosecution. The procedural framework therefore shifts the prac-
tice of defense attorneys toward more aggressive advocacy. At the same
time, the very possibility of aggressive advocacy likely helps convince
attorneys that the trials are primarily adjudicative.
3. Acquittal and Dismissal Rates
Although the professional identity of defense attorneys and the influ-
ence of the tribunals' procedural framework may provide a partial ex-
planation for the lawyers' views, other factors further help explain why
defense lawyers believe that international criminal trials serve to sepa-
rate the guilty from the innocent. Data from ICTY and ICTR judgments
suggest that defense attorneys are not mistaken in their perceptions. Tri-
als at these tribunals are in fact contested, and their outcomes are not
predetermined.2 5 9 The rates of acquittals and charge dismissals at the
ICTY and ICTR do not appear to be lower than the same rates in do-
mestic settings. As of November 19, 2007, the ICTY trial chambers had
found sixty-two defendants guilty.260 The court had fully acquitted nine
defendants, or 14.5%,261 and the prosecution withdrew five indictments
after the accused had been transferred to the tribunal.262 As of Novem-
ber 28, 2007, the ICTR trial chambers had handed down judgments in-
257. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 4 (1981); Luban, supra note 56, at
139.
258. Langer, supra note 256, at 861.
259. As mentioned earlier, this element of risk in the outcome is what distinguishes a "show
trial" from a regular trial. Peterson, supra note 2, at 263.
260. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY at a Glance: Key Fig-
ures, http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index-t.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2007).
261. Id. This percentage is roughly the same as the percentage of acquittals at Nuremberg.
There, three out of twenty-two defendants (almost 14%) were acquitted, and a number of conspir-
acy charges were dismissed, as were charges against so-called criminal organizations.
262. The charges against Marinko Katava, Ivan Santi6, and Pero Skopljak were withdrawn on
December 19, 1997. The charges against Nenad Banovi6 were withdrawn on April 10, 2002, and
those against Agim Murtezi on February 28, 2003. Twenty other indictments were withdrawn
before the commencement of proceedings. Id.
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volving thirty-five accused.263 The cases of two defendants are currently
on appeal, and one defendant died less than two months after the trial
chamber judgment was rendered, without the possibility of an appeal.264
Of the remaining thirty-two, five were acquitted.265 This represents an
acquittal rate of 15.6%, which is similar to the acquittal rate of the
ICTY and is higher than the rate of acquittals in either U.S. federal court
or French or German criminal courts.26 6
There were also many more charge dismissals and partial acquittals
at both the ICTY and ICTR. At the ICTY, as of April 12, 2005, defen-
dants were acquitted of 206 counts out of a total of 475 counts con-
firmed by the trial chambers. 267 At the ICTR, if dismissals of complicity
in genocide charges are excluded (because a person cannot be charged
as both a principal and an accomplice, and the prosecution routinely
charges both, there is a 95% rate of dismissals of such complicity
charges), the rate of other genocide charges resulting in dismissals or
partial acquittals is roughly one-third.268 Of these, the ones that result
most frequently in acquittals or dismissals are conspiracy charges
(roughly 63%), followed by command responsibility and joint criminal
263. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Cases: Status of Cases,
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. In 2002, 89% of all defendants whose cases were concluded in U.S. district court were
convicted. The 11% that were not convicted can be broken down as follows-10% had their
charges dismissed, and only 1% were acquitted. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2002, at 11 (2005),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bj s/abstract/fccp02.htm. Because over 90% of convictions in the United
States result from guilty pleas, it is difficult to compare the outcomes of international criminal
trials to those of American trials. Still, the numbers show that trials in the United States are not
significantly more contested, and in fact appear to be somewhat less contested, than those at the
ICTY and ICTR. Data from Germany in 1992 show that of willful homicide complaints filed that
year, 2% were dismissed after filing, and 4% resulted in acquittals. Of the 94% convicted, 46%
were convicted of willful homicide, while 48% were convicted on other charges. The acquittal
rates for robbery and rape are 3% and 5%, respectively. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
GERMAN AND AMERICAN PROSECUTIONS: AN APPROACH TO STATISTICAL COMPARISON 18-20
(1998), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/gap.pdf. In France, a study from 1995 reports a
7.3% acquittal rate for jury trials in Paris. Roderick Munday, What Do the French Think of Their
Jury? Views from Poitiers and Paris, 15 LEGAL STUD. 65, 73 (1995). Another author mentions a
conviction rate "approaching ninety-five percent." LEUBSDORF, supra note 250, at 83.
267. James Meemik, The International Criminal Tribunals Database Website: ICTY Count,
http://www.psci.unt.edu/-meernik/IntemationalCriminalTribunalsWebsite.htm.
268. These figures are based on a November 2006 review of completed cases. The rate of ac-
quittals and dismissals for charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity is even higher.
Fourteen out of fifteen defendants were acquitted of war crimes charges against them. Eight of
twenty-six defendants were acquitted of crimes against humanity, and fourteen more defendants
were acquitted of some crimes against humanity counts.
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enterprise charges (roughly 56% and 50%, respectively), charges for
genocide as a principal perpetrator (24%), and charges for incitement of
genocide (12.5%).269
4. The Expanding Reach of International Criminal Law
One possible explanation for the relatively high acquittal and dis-
missal rates is that a number of the charges at international criminal tri-
bunals concern offenses for which it is difficult to prove the defendant's
knowledge or intent. An obvious example is genocide, which requires
proof of a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, eth-
nic, racial or religious group. But other factors also help explain dis-
missals and acquittals across offense categories at the ICTY and ICTR.
These include the tribunals' charging practices and evolving jurispru-
dence.
Since the establishment of the ICTR and ICTY, substantive interna-
tional criminal law has experienced unprecedented growth. Provisions
in existing treaties, like the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Con-
vention, have been interpreted and applied liberally. The jurisprudence
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals-particularly on crimes against
humanity-has also been revived and extended to new situations. Criti-
cally, prosecutors have used principles of command responsibility,
complicity, and joint criminal enterprise to reach a number of persons
who did not directly commit crimes.
The active use of some of these principles by prosecutors has given
rise to serious tensions with the notion of individual criminal liability.
270
Joint criminal enterprise poses a special problem in this respect, similar
to difficulties that have arisen with extensive use of conspiracy in U.S.
criminal prosecutions. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted,
[conspiracy] is perhaps not greatly different from other [crimes]
when the scheme charged is tight and the number involved small.
But as it is broadened to include more and more, in varying de-
grees of attachment to the confederation, the possibilities for
miscarriage of justice to particular individuals become greater
and greater.271
269. See supra note 267.
270. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 38, at 144-46.
271. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). In one respect, however, joint
criminal enterprise is less problematic than conspiracy. It "is a species of liability for the substan-
tive offense (akin to aiding and abetting), not a crime on its own." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749, 2785 n.40 (2006).
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Similar misgivings over the law of conspiracy brought judges at the
Nuremberg Tribunal to limit conspiracy charges considerably.2 72 It
should not be surprising, then, that judges at the ICTY and ICTR have
also resisted some of the broader readings of joint criminal enterprise
and command responsibility urged by the prosecution.
273
Separately, the rapid growth of international criminal law has created
unpredictability for both the defense and the prosecution. One of the re-
sponses to this uncertainty by the prosecution has been to pile cumula-
tive charges for the same conduct, 274 but this has also given the defense
more legitimate grounds to ask for dismissal of charges and for judges
to grant such dismissals.
In addition to this remarkable growth in substantive international
criminal law, a broader prosecutorial strategy has increased the chances
that cases would be based on weak evidence. The ICTY and ICTR have
conducted a number of prosecutions that is unprecedented for interna-
tional tribunals, and they have prosecuted both military and civilian de-
fendants, all along the chain of command. At the same time, the tribu-
nals are located away from the crime scene, and they lack reliable
enforcement mechanisms. For reasons of both politics and geography,
access to the crime scene and to supporting evidence has proven a chal-
lenge for the prosecution. Investigators and prosecutors are typically
foreign, so they often find it difficult to understand the context of the
crimes-the command structures, ethnic loyalties, and political rival-
ries-and to apportion responsibility accordingly. At the ICTY, the
prosecution has already withdrawn twenty indictments before com-
mencement of proceedings, and five after the accused had been trans-
ferred to the tribunal, meaning that about 15% of the public indictments
have been withdrawn.
5. Judicial Independence
Even if it is true that international prosecutors have difficulty gather-
ing evidence for their cases and that they resort to overbroad legal theo-
ries in their indictments, trials could still be largely political if judges
sided with the prosecution in the face of flimsy evidence and unsup-
272. Wald, supra note 173, at 1592.
273. On command responsibility, see Danner & Martinez, supra note 38, at 127-29. On joint
criminal enterprise, see, for example, Harmen van der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Possibili-
ties and Limitations, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 91, 92 (2007).
274. See Patricia Wald, ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An Appraisal from Within, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 466, 469 (2004). This is confirmed by the dismissal statistics cited in note 268.
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ported legal theories. But the responses of most attorneys suggest that
this is not the case and that judges are generally impartial. Only a mi-
nority of the attorneys interviewed for this study complained about
judges' inability to maintain independence from outside pressures or
about their attitude toward the accused.275 Objective factors, such as the
acquittal and dismissal statistics discussed earlier, further tend to con-
firm the impartiality of ICTY and ICTR judges. Finally, the results of a
2003 empirical study of ICTY verdicts and sentences also indicate that
judges at the tribunal are generally not influenced by political factors.276
The study suggests, for example, that judges do not appear to be biased
in favor of NATO, or Western, interests, as some critics have alleged. In
fact, the more NATO judges sit on a panel, the less likely is a defendant
to be found guilty.277 Moreover, the presence of NATO judges on the
panel does not result in a longer sentence. 278 Significantly, the results
also indicate that judges are not biased against Serb defendants in their
verdicts and sentences, again refuting criticisms that the ICTY is a vic-
tor's court.2 7 9
Structural factors help explain these results. For example, the dis-
tance of judges from the cultural and political environment in which the
crimes took place allows judges to maintain independence. Furthermore,
because judges are elected by the UN General Assembly as a whole,280
it is difficult for one interested state (such as Rwanda), or even a group
of states (such as NATO states), to have a determining effect on the vote
and, by extension, on judicial decision-making.
275. Sixteen respondents indicated that a particular judge or judges in general at times dis-
played a bias in favor of the prosecution or otherwise had a problematic attitude toward the de-
fense. E.g., Interview # 19, supra note 188 ("[I]t's clear that you have an attitude from the tribu-
nals... more inclined to listen more attentively to what the prosecutor says."); Questionnaire # 3,
supra note 72 ("The first chamber to try the case was rather anti me or the case! Those judges
were removed for appearance of bias (on another matter) and we had a new and different tribunal
of judges who were excellent"); Questionnaire # 9, supra note 218 (noting that the court allowed
inappropriate and discourteous remarks the prosecutor made against defense counsel). Twenty
respondents, on the other hand, indicated that judges' attitude was not problematic, and a few
emphasized that the court was very respectful toward the defense. Interview # 11, supra note 95;
Interview # 16, supra note 101.
276. James Meemik, Victor's Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 J. CONFL. RES. 140, 153 (2003).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 156.
279. Id. at 153, 154.
280. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 13his.,
13ter, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda arts. l2bis, 12ter, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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Perhaps the greatest recent challenge to the perception of judicial in-
dependence has been the so-called "Completion Strategy"-the man-
date that the tribunals complete their work in the next several years.
2 8
'
To fulfill this mandate, judges have been limiting both parties' time to
examine witnesses and present evidence, and have been making greater
use of affidavits while relying less on oral testimony. 82 They have also
been more willing to demand that prosecutors trim the indictments and
to take judicial notice of certain historical facts of common knowl-
edge.283 A number of commentators, including defense attorneys and
former tribunal judges, have argued that in the aim to fulfill the comple-
tion mandate, judges have unduly prioritized efficiency over fairness. 84
These commentators have criticized the Completion Strategy for un-
dermining the rights of the defense, most notably, the rights to confront
witnesses and to have adequate time to prepare a defense.
To the extent that efficiency is pursued at the expense of fairness and
accuracy, possibly leading to unjustified convictions, the tribunals may
in fact be moving toward a political model, one devoted above all to ef-
ficiency. 85 It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the full ef-
fects of the Completion Strategy, but it is clear that it has reduced the
perceived fairness of the tribunals among some defense attorneys and
outside observers. At the same time, the Completion Strategy has led to
some positive developments for the defense. It has ensured that trials
proceed more quickly, thus protecting the defendants' right to a speedy
trial. It has also forced courts to focus more on the specific charges
against the accused and has led judges to trim overbroad indictments
and rein in prosecutors' attempts to introduce cumulative evidence. In
this way, it has moved the trials away from some of the broad political
goals which animated the work of the prosecution and the court at the
outset of the tribunals' work-the goals of pursuing a fuller historical
record and giving victims the opportunity to achieve closure by testify-
281. See supra note 119.
282. Kwon, supra note 200, at 363-68.
283. Id. at 368-75. The decision to take judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda has been
especially controversial. On the one hand, it obviates the need for the prosecution to introduce
evidence related to well-known historical facts related to the Rwandan conflict; on the other hand,
the decision to take judicial notice of "genocide" could compromise defendants' rights, because
in many cases, the defense has disputed the argument that a genocide took place, or that there was
a conspiracy to commit genocide. Nina H.B. Jorgensen, Genocide as a Fact of Common Knowl-
edge, 56 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 885 (2007).
284. Langer, supra note 256.
285. Id.
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ing in court, among others. From the defense's point of view, this aspect
of the Completion Strategy should be a welcome development.
B. Explaining the Views of Defense Attorneys Who Believe Trials
Follow the Political Model
Although the great majority of respondents did not believe that trials
at the ICTR and ICTY were primarily political events, a few thought
otherwise. There are several possible explanations for the views of the
attorneys who viewed the trials as politicized, and these explanations
take into account the higher percentage of such views among ICTR
practitioners.
First, as discussed earlier, the government of Rwanda has tried to in-
terfere with the work of the ICTR more substantially than governments
in the former Yugoslavia have done with the ICTY.286 Importantly, evi-
dence suggests that at times the Rwandan government may have been
successful in interfering. The most poignant example is that of defen-
dant Barayagwiza, accused of committing genocide in Rwanda. After
finding that the ninety-six-day delay between Barayagwiza's transfer to
the ICTR's detention unit and his initial appearance before a judge vio-
lated his fundamental rights, the ICTR Appeals Chamber ordered his re-
lease.287 In response, the Rwandan government threatened it would
cease all cooperation with the tribunal.288 Soon thereafter, the Appeals
Chamber reversed its own decision, citing new evidence presented by
the prosecution, 289 but some commentators argued the decision was ren-
dered to appease the Rwandan government without the support of which
the tribunal could not function. 290
This was perhaps the most overt act of pressure by the Rwandan gov-
ernment on the ICTR, but the government also has criticized the tribu-
nal's slowness and its treatment of Rwandan victims and suggested it
may suspend cooperation on those grounds as well.291 Furthermore, the
Rwandan government has repeatedly made it very difficult for defense
286. See supra Section II.H.
287. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Nov. 2, 1999).
288. Kigali Protest Against UN Tribunal, BBC NEWS, Nov. 15, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/521807.stm.
289. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor's Re-
quest for Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000).
290. Mercedeh Momeni, Why Barayagwiza Is Boycotting His Trial at the ICTR: Lessons in
Balancing Due Process Rights and Politics, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315 (2001); William A.
Schabas, Case Report, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2000).
291. See Victor Peskin, Rwandan Ghosts, LEGAL AFF., Sept/Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2002/feature-peskin-sepoct2002.msp.
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attorneys to conduct investigations on Rwandan territory. It has threat-
ened to arrest and has in fact arrested ICTR defense investigators and
has accused ICTR lawyers of attempting to bribe witnesses in
Rwanda. 292 Rwandan authorities also have directly interfered with de-
fense witnesses. 293 It is therefore not surprising that several defense at-
torneys argued that Rwandan pressure on the ICTR politicized the tri-
bunal and the trial proceedings.
Although both ICTR and ICTY lawyers expressed some dissatisfac-
tion with the way the Registry handled their pay and reimbursements,
such complaints were somewhat more common at the ICTR.2 94 There
are a couple of possible explanations for this difference. First, the ICTY
has switched from an hourly compensation to lump-sum payments to
the defense. The ICTR still pays lawyers by the hour. But because the
hourly payment is subject to greater abuse, it also requires more exten-
sive paperwork and occasions greater scrutiny by the Registry. The
hourly pay structure is more likely to give rise to disagreements be-
tween defense teams and the Registry as to whether particular expenses
are warranted. By contrast, the lump-sum structure places responsibility
for managing the budget largely within the defense's hands.
Relations between the ICTR Registry and defense are also particu-
larly tense because of the Registry's inability to intervene on the attor-
neys' behalf to end the obstruction of defense investigations by the
Rwandan government. Although governments in the former Yugoslavia
have also at times refused to cooperate with ICTY defense attorneys, as
noted earlier, this has been a greater problem in Rwanda. The Rwandan
government's obstructionist tactics have provoked resentment among
defense lawyers, and this resentment has been directed in part toward
the Registry, whom the lawyers blame for failing to come to their aid.
Finally, ICTR defense attorneys are more likely than their ICTY
counterparts to claim that the tribunals' prosecutors are bringing charges
selectively. While the ICTY did prosecute some members of all groups
involved in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTR only
292. African News Analysis Blog, ICTR Clears a Lawyer Accused of Bribing a Witness, Mar.
23, 2007, http://africannewsanalysis.blogspot.com/2007 03 25 archive.html; Questionnaire # 9,
supra note 218; Interview # 29, supra note 216.
293. Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Judgment, 1 49 (Dec. 13, 2005) (find-
ing interference by Rwandan authorities with a defense witness, but holding that the error was
harmless).
294. Seven respondents directly complained that the ICTR had refused to reimburse what
they thought were legitimate expenses, while only three ICTY attorneys made the same com-
plaint.
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prosecuted Rwandan Hutus and not the Tutsis who are currently in
power in Rwanda. The Prosecutor justified this decision on the grounds
that the vast majority of crimes-and the most serious crimes-
committed during the genocide in Rwanda were in fact committed by
Rwandan Hutus. 2 9 5 While the focus on the most serious crimes and on
Hutu suspects may be legitimate, the survey here shows that this exclu-
sive focus has hurt the tribunal's legitimacy among a number of defense
attorneys.
The complaints voiced by defense attorneys suggest that while the
actual trial proceedings are less likely to be seen as politicized, deci-
sions preceding or surrounding these proceedings may influence the
way trials are perceived. Such decisions concern jurisdiction and charg-
ing, the level of administrative support for the defense, and the relation-
ship between the tribunals and the governments on whose territory the
evidence for the crimes is located. As the International Criminal Court
begins its first trials, these are lessons it ought to consider in arranging
its relations with the defense.
CONCLUSION
In the long-running debate about the purpose of international criminal
trials, the perspective of practicing defense lawyers has not traditionally
received a great deal of attention. This Article has argued that a sam-
pling of the opinions of defense lawyers suggests that these trials are
much farther from being constructed primarily to satisfy important po-
litical purposes and much nearer to being truly adjudicative proceedings
whose difficult but crucial function is to separate those who are truly
blameworthy from those who are not. The views of defense lawyers in
international criminal trials today appear to reflect a belief in the inno-
cence of many defendants, on both factual and legal grounds, as well as
a belief in the possibility of acquittals for these defendants. This Article
has further suggested that defense lawyers' perceptions are not merely
inevitable products of their role, but are supported by an increasing
number of acquittals, dismissals, and vigorous debates about liability
doctrines and rules of procedure and evidence at these tribunals. Finally,
and contrary to popular perceptions, most defense attorneys do not view
political statements or attacks as appropriate tactics in international
criminal trials.
295. Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice, 3 J.
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The perceptions of those who participate in the trials say something
about what kind of proceedings these are. Even as international trials re-
tain their unique political importance, the attitudes of those actually en-
gaged in them reflect their character as increasingly adjudicative pro-
ceedings, with separation of the guilty from the innocent as a central
purpose. Importantly, as key players in the trials, defense attorneys not
only reflect, but also influence the proceedings, shifting them further
toward the adjudicative model.
Of course, fully contested, adversarial trials serve both legal and po-
litical purposes. But to the extent that these purposes occasionally come
into conflict-where, for example, political purposes such as efficient
closure and establishment of a historical record might recommend one
set of procedures, and classic legal principles might recommend an-
other-the debate becomes important. If international criminal trials in-
creasingly serve the same fundamental adjudicative purposes as domes-
tic trials, then the procedures of the tribunal and the duties and actions
of the participants will adjust accordingly. The actions and perceptions
of international defense lawyers provide a significant signal that interna-
tional criminal trials are moving in this direction.
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